In this book, scholars from disciplines like anthropology, history, linguistics and philology engage with the subject of how Koreans who live outside Korea had to re-define their own distinct cultural life in a foreign environment. Most Koreans in the diaspora define themselves through their ancestry, their language and their religion. Language serves as a strong argument for defining one’s own identity within a multi ethnic society. Ethnic Koreans in the diaspora tend to cultivate their own very special dialects. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of China, most ethnic Koreans in Central Asia, Manchuria and Siberia came again into close contact with Koreans especially from South Korea. There is a certain desire amongst many ethnic Koreans to learn the standard Korean language instead of sticking to their own dialects. This volume investigates constructions of Korean diasporic identity from a variety of temporal and spatial contexts.
Johannes Reckel and Merle Schatz (Eds.)
Korean Diaspora – Central Asia, Siberia and Beyond

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Johannes Reckel and
Merle Schatz (Eds.)

Korean Diaspora –
Central Asia, Siberia
and Beyond

Universitätsverlag Göttingen
2020
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Introduction

Johannes Reckel

On the 17th and 18th of February 2016 more than 20 experts from many countries came together during a conference on Korean diaspora organized by the State and University Library in Göttingen.

The conference aimed at bringing together experts in the field of anthropology, history, linguistics, philology from different regions of the Korean Diaspora to give insights into the challenges of an ethnic identity that needs defining and redefining in a changing environment. The volume represents several topics discussed at the conference, but not all papers presented were submitted for publication.

Korean Diaspora is in the first place defined as ethnic Koreans having moved out of Korea for economic, political and other reasons, like education. Diaspora is a result of voluntary or forced migration away from the ethnic homeland. It may in some cases be the result of war or wars. Diaspora typically is represented by small ethnic groups often without direct contact with their home nation(s) and surrounded by other ethnic groups or one large dominating ethnic group, like the Japanese, Russians or Chinese.
Table 1: Korean diaspora 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,546,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,461,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>824,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>241,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>177,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>172,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>169,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>167,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>109,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>85,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>48,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>44,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>40,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>38,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>29,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>23,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>22,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>21,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>20,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>18,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>13,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>11,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>11,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Korean diaspora is the result of different historical migration waves, the earliest in mediaeval times and earlier. Many Koreans from these early times have become assimilated over the centuries. If we define Korean diaspora through groups of ethnic Koreans who still see themselves as Korean and often speak Korean, we are mainly concerned with the past 200 odd years. Descendants of Koreans who today have lost their original ethnic identity as Korean and may identify as Chinese etc. should not be counted here. They nevertheless play a political role.

Of special interest are the kingdoms of Koguryŏ (37 BC – 668 AD) and Parhae (698 – 926) as their territory covered large parts of Manchuria, now a part of China. The language of Koguryŏ was probably if at all only very loosely related to the language of the southern “Korean” kingdom of Silla, that later unified a large part of the Korean peninsula. Some scholars link the Koguryŏ language to Japanese rather than Korean.2 The modern Korean language developed from the old Silla language.

In recent years research in South Korea focused very much on descendants from Koguryŏ in today’s China. In the area of Liaoyang in southern Manchuria there is today living a family that bears the family name Ko (chin. Gao 高). This family name is very rare in China. The kings of Koguryŏ later shortened their family name to Ko after the Chinese fashion. The family name “Ko” is derived from the ethnonym/toponym Koguryŏ.

In Parhae the family of Ko also played an important role. A handwritten genealogy of the family Ko from Liaoyang written in 1921 and based on an earlier version from 1686 surfaced in China in 1989 and was published in a special volume (No 1) of the series Koguryŏ yŏngu in Seoul in 1995.3 The family Ko according to this genealogy traced its roots back to the royal house of Koguryŏ. The members of the family Ko from Liaoyang do not speak Korean nor the old Koguryŏ language but still feel somewhat special and are proud of their ancestry.

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The concept of Korea as a one nation state has developed only relatively recently since the twelfth century, when Kim Pusik, following the tradition of Silla, the only surviving “Korean” kingdom after 926, wrote his chronicle of the three kingdoms “Samguk sagi”, that forged three (or more) originally very different identities into one “Korea”, overlaying older concepts. Thus the existence of different regional early mediaeval kingdoms like Puyŏ, Okcho, Koguryŏ and Parhae in the North and Paekche, Silla, the Mahans and Kaya in the South, a situation of very different and possibly only loosely related “Korean” ethnic groups that lasted until the 11th century AD, when an artificial, unhistoric national unity was created posthumously for an early multiethnic “Korea”, lead to modern claims made by Korea (North and South) to the old territory of Koguryŏ, Parhae and Puyŏ, what is now largely the Northeast of China. The wars between the different “Korean” states and also of “Korean” states with neighboring nations like the Jurchen, Mongols or Chinese lead to migratory movements which today do not leave many direct traces.

This early historic challenge of forging a national unity from a diverse ethnic situation is also reflected in much more recent developments of the Korean diaspora.

As seen from the figures given above the number of Koreans in the United States of America is significant. Still these American Koreans tend to assimilate into the general American population rather fast since the United States of America has always been known as a melting pot for immigrants, though racism is still an issue. In the USA Koreans are much more part of the general Asian American community, including Chinese and Vietnamese and other ethnic backgrounds, as opposed to Afro Americans or the White Americans or Native Americans. On the other hand, the Korean communities in Northeast China, Japan, Russia, and Central Asia keep their identity longer. They often live in their own ethnic communities or as in the case of China within their own autonomous prefectures and districts.

The migration of ethnic Korean groups now living in China, Japan, Russia, Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia, setting aside the very recent migration from South and North Korea, is not so much rooted in the middle ages but largely in the worsening economic situation, especially for the rural population of Korea during the 19th century, followed by the aggressive behavior of Japan after the Russian Japanese war in 1904/05 that resulted in the complete annexation of Korea from 1910 until 1945 by Japan, which in turn lead many politically active Koreans to join anti-Japanese groups in the Soviet Union and China. In addition, since Korea was part of the Japanese empire for 35 years, many Koreans remained in Japan after 1945.

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Most Koreans in Japan still identify themselves as Korean. They are known as Zainichi in Japanese. Most of them associate with two organizations: Mindan, which is close to South Korea and Ch’ongryŏn, which is close to North Korea. Both organizations have their own Korean schools and cultural centers. As Ae Ran Jeong demonstrates in her contribution, it is very difficult for a Zainichi to be close to South and North Korea, to associate with Mindan and Ch’ongryŏn at the same time, to be just a Korean.5

The Koreans in the Soviet Union who originally settled mainly in the Far East of Russia were moved by Stalin to Central Asia. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Korea War 1950 to 1953 a new stream of migrants moved from South Korea to Germany, America and other western countries. Finally, the worsening economic situation in North Korea over the past two decades made many Koreans flee from North Korea to China and onward to other countries. On the other hand, the economic reforms in China made China and especially the Northeast of China, where many Koreans had settled over the past 150 years or so attractive for South Korean entrepreneurs. The region of Manchuria became a melting pot and sometimes a pulver keg of three different Korean diaspora groups. The cheaper education system in China, which also supported Korean schools in the autonomous regions of the Northeast made it attractive for whole South Korean families to move to China.

Since 1950 Korea has been divided into two separate states and the society in both parts has developed into different directions. This creates special forms of migration of distinct ethnic Korean groups. One is formed by refugees from North Korea to China, where other groups of ethnic Koreans have been living for often hundreds of years, and from China over third countries to South Korea. At the same time there are hundreds of thousands of South Koreans moving to China since 1992 to do business in China or to find a good and affordable education for their children. This leads to interaction and often tension between three different groups of ethnic Koreans with different backgrounds, all of them living as minority groups in diaspora together or rather side by side, complemented by the interaction with the Han-Chinese majority.6

Groups of ethnic Koreans in the diaspora without contact with their homeland for a long time tend to cultivate their own very special dialects, like the Yukchin dialect in Kazakhstan, which is often unintelligible to mainstream Koreans from North or South Korea.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of China, it has become possible again for most ethnic Koreans in Central Asia, Manchuria and Siberia to

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come into close contact with Koreans especially from South Korea. They can also travel more freely. There is a certain desire amongst many ethnic Koreans to learn the standard Korean language instead of sticking to their own dialects. South Korea with her prospering economy has become the land of their dreams.

Korean schools in Central Asia and Siberia are now often run by South Koreans. Teaching is according to textbooks from South Korea, as Nelly Park described the situation during the conference. The ethnic Koreans from the area of the former Soviet Union call themselves Koryŏ Saram. At the same time, many ethnic Koreans in Kazakhstan, eastern Siberia or Manchuria have already given up their mother tongue in favour of Russian or Chinese. This is reflected in the language of local newspapers like the Lenin Kichi (now Koryŏ Ilbo) from Kazakhstan or others from the Vladivostok area as described by Alexander Kim in his contribution.

Though language certainly is one of the strongest elements for ethnic identity, it is not the only one. It usually takes several generations after the loss of the original native language to lose the ethnic identity completely. In many cases personal names, religion, food, music etc. live longer than the language. In the case of Koreans in Central Asia, the simple fact that they look different from nearly all indigenous peoples of that region keeps the memory of being Korean alive. Unlike with other ethnic groups like black people looking Korean does not lead to discrimination within a multiethnic society that is used to diversity. The “Chinese” Dungans in Central Asia are just another similar example of an ethnic group from East Asia that moved into Central Asia because of civil war in the 19th century.

At last, it should be mentioned how Koreans going abroad export their culture. K-Pop, which was one topic during the conference, is one example of Korean culture conquering the world stage.

The Korean collection at the State and University Library Göttingen

During the conference on the Korean Diaspora the Consul General of the Republic of Korea, His Excellency Seo-jeong Chang from Hamburg presented the State and University Library Göttingen with a financial support of 32,393 US $ to build a virtual ebook library of Korean literature in cooperation with Kyobo bookstore in Seoul. The Digital Library has been successfully established since and was opened in a special ceremony in Göttingen on January 21, 2017. The Korean Ebook Library has since been open to users from all German academic institution on application. About 4000 Korean titles are available online. The State and University Library Göttingen has also the largest Korean collection in Germany of about 100,000 Korean titles in print.

The Korean Ebook Library Göttingen serves the Korean diaspora in Germany. But it also makes the Korean literature more accessible and better known to German students and scholars. Korean literature, language, culture, history play an

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important role to understand East Asian culture in general. The understanding of Korea and Koreans is not complete without a view on the contribution from the Korean diaspora in Central Asia, Siberia, Japan and beyond.

Most of the modern printed Korean literature in Goettingen can be searched online in the online catalogue https://opac.sub.uni-goettingen.de/ by inserting into the search slot “spr\kor”.

To access the Ebook Library go to http://uni-goettingen.dkyobobook.co.kr, and follow the link to “회원가입”.

Most ethnic groups in general define themselves through their ancestry, their language and their religion, language usually being the strongest element in a multi ethnic society. Language becomes a public medium through broadcasting, be it via radio, television or videos online, through internet communication in public or semi-public social networks and through printed media, also on record, tape, CD, CD-ROM, DVD etc.

One of the aims of this Conference is furthermore to discuss the founding of a specialized collection of Korean diaspora literature and media in a central archive here in Goettingen, which already houses the largest collection of Korean literature in Germany.

The State and University Library has a long standing and intimate relationship with Korea and Korean culture. Our library is home to a copy of the Gutenberg Bible, the first book in Europe that was printed with moveable letters. But of course, the oldest book worldwide that was printed with moveable letters hails from Korea and is the famous Chikchi (Dschiktschi) printed in 1377, two generations before Gutenberg. Both books are now included in the list of world heritage under the UNESCO-Register “Memory of the World”. In 2004 the UNESCO even approved a special “Jikji Memory of the World Prize”, a biennial award.8

In 2003, the State and University Library Goettingen hosted a joint exhibition and conference on the early printing culture in Germany and Korea, followed up by a similar conference the following year in Tschöngdschu in Korea.

The Korean tradition in Goettingen started in the 18th century when the Baron Georg Thomas v. Asch (1729–1807) who had studied at the university in Göttin- gen and later became a high-ranking medical officer in Russia, donated a large collection of Russian and Asian material to his old university. This collection also contains early European maps of Korea, a country nearly completely sealed off from the rest of the world for hundreds of years until the late 19th century.

In more recent times, right after the Second World War, the German Research Foundation (DFG) established a funding system to build special collections of literature in German libraries. The State and University Library in Goettingen thus became a center for Altaic and Korean literature. In over 60 years over 100,000 volumes in the Korean language including many thousand books from North Ko-

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rea, were bought. The funding from the German Research Foundation unfortunately stopped from 2015 and there is an uncertain future to the Korean collection, which at present relies mainly on donations. Since 2019, the Special Information Service for Central Asia and Siberia with funding from the German Research Foundation has been established at the State and University Library Goettingen. This Special Information Service also collects websites from Central Asia and Siberia in cooperation with the “Centre of Research Libraries” and the “Internet Archive/Archive.It” in the United States of America.

For many decades until 2003, the collection of Korean literature in Goettingen was looked after and expanded greatly by the Korean scholar Dr. Hiu Lie. Hiu Lie did not only collect printed material on behalf of the library, but also built a most comprehensive library on microfilms of manuscripts of Korean fiction, tales and novels. In over four years from 1982 to 1985 1291 titles were collected. The original manuscripts are scattered all over the world from Japan and Korea to Russia, France and America, but on microfilm they are available here in one library in Goettingen. Some manuscripts have 6000 or 8000 pages, some are shorter. Dr. Hiu Lie also published a catalogue of this collection in Goettingen of the so-called Kososŏl literature.9

This conference was not about early printing culture, nor early manuscripts of Korean of Korean fiction. However, the subject is nevertheless special and deserves attention. Here we are going to learn about Koreans who live outside Korea or as North Koreans outside North Korea and had to redefine and live their own distinct cultural life in a foreign environment. How could they preserve their language, their literature, their identity? How do they express themselves to each other and to the outer world? Perhaps their written expressions, be they printed on paper or found on homepages and online chats, may form the basis for another specialized collection here in the State and University Library Göttingen.

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Korean Diaspora: From History to Present Day.
Key Note Speech

His Excellency See-jeong Chang

Dear Prof. Ulrike Beisiegel, President of Göttingen University,
Dear Dr. Wolfram Horstmann, director of the State and University Library,
Dear Dr. Johannes Reckel, organizer of the international conference,
Dear lecturers and participants!

I would like to give my warm welcome to everybody here from many parts of the world and thank you for your presence in what will surely prove to be a very stimulating event. Many notable scholars have studied and taught at Göttingen University, which is internationally renowned and respected for its excellence. Thus, it attracts students and scholars from all over the world, including Korea. In fact, we do not have to look further than this campus to find part of our young and bright Korean diaspora right here.

An interesting schedule lies ahead of us throughout the next two days. As you know, timewise, the lecture topics roughly span the 20th century. The historical backdrops of all presentations amount to a panorama of recent history seen through the lens of Korean migration.

Experiences and practices of migration and diaspora highly pervade the history of modern Korea. They are closely connected to global orders of modernity, colonialism, the Cold War, and globalization, and they highlight the influx of Korean
workforce and goods throughout Asia, Europe and the Americas, thus illustrating the global connections between the Koreas and the world.

1 Introduction

Migration has been a part of human life since prehistory. Through the movement and evolution of early humans crossing the globe, the conditions were set for the beginnings of civilization. There are varied reasons for modern humans to migrate: to flee from natural hazards, religious or political persecution, to escape hunger and poverty, to seek stability, prosperity, and on the whole, better life conditions.

In present day, in the era of globalization, migration is increasing, mostly for economic reasons, with exceptions of course in regions like the Middle East. Integration of refugees is an issue of utmost importance in Germany and Europe. I will come back to it later. Worldwide, Germany has become the country with the second largest number of immigrants, after the USA. Roughly, 23% of all students enrolled at German universities come from families with an immigration background.

As for Korea, our flourished economy is attracting an influx of workforce from other countries. Millions of foreign workers are living in Korea, enjoying a salary and standard of life much higher than the Asian average for labor migrants.

1.1 Diaspora – theoretical foundation

“Migration” and “diaspora” are interrelated, but not synonymous terms. There is no widely accepted universal definition of “diaspora”, however, a recent handbook proposes the following working definition:

“Emigrants and their descendants, who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin”.

Political scientist William Safran argued that only when a group of migrants shares certain characteristics – a collective memory of their origin, a consideration of this origin as their true homeland, and a lasting strong influence from this origin on the group’s identity, we can speak of a diaspora.

Sociologist Robin Cohen identifies different categories of diaspora, such as victim diaspora, labor diaspora, imperial diaspora, trade diaspora and deterritorialized diaspora, though this categorization is seen as problematic by other scholars in the field for various reasons.

In any case, we know that the topic of diaspora, which in its original, biblical use of the term refers to ancient civilization, is a very vibrant and relevant phenomenon in present day.
Its diachronic and synchronic research has proven that the mobility, settlement and networking of diasporas decisively stimulates economic, social, cultural and political transformation. Diasporic groups are by no means a marginal category, much rather, they can be service agents acting as mediators between the spaces and civilizations in which they are living. Very often, these communities engage in development processes through their own initiative, and it is therefore important to explore strategies that may facilitate their participation in both countries of origin and the countries where they live.

1.2 Current migration to Germany

These days, we are witnessing massive migratory currents, flowing particularly from the Middle East and Northern Africa to the European continent. Through daily media reports and an emotionally charged political debate, refugee influx to Europe and Germany has been a hot topic over the past months.

It is not a new fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is a country of immigration. Think of post-Second World War migration and how significantly it changed German society – even though those immigrants coming from Eastern Europe at the time had German roots. Today, I think the robust German economy is in a condition enough to cope with the incoming refugees, and that these refugees might even have a positive effect for Germany, considering the dramatic demographic development that it is facing. In any case, the social impact will be significant. Chancellor Merkel expects refugees to return to their homelands eventually, but realistically, how many years might it take to create the conditions for that to happen? While the legal frame for accommodating refugees is still under discussion, diasporas of Syrian, Iraqi, Eritrean and other refugees have already physically come into existence here.

In the light of these developments, the 21st century is clearly faced with challenges that make the study and understanding of diaspora crucial not only for decision makers on local, national and international levels, but also for the wider public. To inquire the political, social, economic and cultural demands by migrants and people living in the diaspora enables us to raise questions of integration, solidarity, and conflict during the process of formation of heterogeneous societies. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile remembering the very recent Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s mention, that “Germany is an anchor of hope for many people, which is a fact we shouldn’t complain about”.
2 Overview Korean Diaspora

Focusing now on our present-day Korean diaspora, I would first like to introduce some numbers. Then I will trace back some of the emigrants’ stories to show the circumstances which have driven these particular groups of Koreans to leave their home country. I try to sketch what it meant for them to live in a foreign country as a minority. This will then bring me to talk about the challenges that our modern diaspora is facing, and comment on the stance and policies that our South Korean government has taken on this topic.

2.1 Present situation

Roughly, 7.26 million people in 175 countries constitute the Korean diaspora today. In relation to the size of the homeland population, Korea ranks among those countries with a comparatively high expat ratio, like Israel, Italy, Lebanon or China. Most Korean expatriates, four fifths, are living in either China, the United States or Japan. These countries have a Korean population of 2.5 million, 2 million and 900 thousand respectively. Other countries that are home to large Korean minorities are Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The largest Korean population in Europe, comprising 45 thousand people, can be found in the UK, followed by Germany as the most important destination for Korean emigrants on continental Europe, with a diaspora of round about 35 thousand.

The members of the Korean diaspora are the descendants of emigrants from different periods in history. Since a) the decline of the Yi Dynasty and b) during Japanese colonialism, c) after regaining independence and throughout the stage of Korea’s economic flourishment, emigration has taken place within these three main phases.

A TV documentary I recently saw here told the story of families from Lübeck, a Northern German city, who, in the 17th and 18th centuries, considered migration to the USA, but then, attracted by the vast Russian land, they decided to migrate to the East. They followed the historical trade route of the Hanse, all the way to Saratov and Samara, where the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was declared in 1924.

Imagine what would have become of them if they had stuck to their original plan of crossing the Atlantic. Probably, their descendants would be better off now. Under Stalin, however, the German minority was suppressed, just like Korean minorities in the Primorie region. Korean minorities were detained and deported, not to labor camps, but to the open fields in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where they had to begin from scratch under severe cold weather conditions. When I visited Uzbekistan, I got an impression of how the Korean diaspora community had
formed and developed. Some of them succeeded, the CEO of Uzbekistan Airways is the most representative case.

2.2 Korean Emigration

The first phase took place roughly between the 1860s and 1910. Following the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, the economic situation in Korea deteriorated towards the end of the Lee Dynasty. Economic hardship triggered emigration to China, Russia, Hawaii, Mexico, and from there, later on, to Cuba. The second phase took place during the colonial era. Under Japanese colonization, many peasants and laborers were deprived of their land and means of production, causing them to resettle to Manchuria or Japan. Political enemies of the colonial rulers, associated with the Korean Independence Movement, left Korea for China and Russia. An outstanding example is the Lee family. Six brothers of noble descent sold their property for the benefit of the Korean independence movement. The family was really so rich before leaving Korea that nobody could enter Seoul without treading ground in their property. But they got together and made up their mind to leave the country in order to initiate the independence movement. Lee Dongnyeong, Lee Si-yeong, Lee Hoe-young and Lee Sang-ryong founded the Military School of the New Rising or Shinheung Military Academy in 1911. Later, Lee Si-yeong served the Provisional Government of Korea in exile in Shanghai.

2.3 Sakhalin Koreans

As Japan’s war effort picked up, the Japanese government sought to put more people on the ground in the sparsely-populated prefecture in order to ensure their control of the territory and fill the increasing demands of the coal mines and lumber yards. Recruiters turned to sourcing workers from the Korean peninsula to take advantage of the low wages there; at one point, over 150,000 Koreans worked on Sakhalin Island.

2.4 Forced laborers in Japan

Last year, UNESCO decided to grant world heritage status to more than 20 old Meiji period industrial sites in Japan, after Japanese officials agreed to acknowledge that they used Korean forced laborers during the Second World War. An estimated 60 thousand Korean workers were forced to work at seven of these sites under slave conditions. These 60 thousand Korean workers are only a tiny part of the whole several million of Korean enforced or slave workers, which was also a vital part of the Imperial Japanese economic exploitation of Korea. With Japanese regis-
tration of these heritage sites, it was promised that visitors will be informed in the appropriate manner about the history of slave labor on Hashima Island, but I am afraid the requirements have still not been met.

2.5 Third phase: Post-liberation – Korean War – Economic Migration since 1960s

After the surrender of Japan in 1945, Korea gained its independence, but the devastating war and the division of Korea led to further emigration in post-war years. Economic migration thereafter accounts for the 2 million Koreans living in the US today, primarily a result of the massive migration following the US Immigration Act that abolished the Asian quota system in 1965. A little less than half a million Koreans live in Canada, Australia and the UK, raising the number of Koreans in the English-speaking world to about 2.5 million.

2.6 Return Migration of Overseas Koreans

Repatriation policies have encouraged diasporic Koreans to return to the homeland. Sakhalin Koreans, for example, repatriated partly through government incentives, but also through their own initiatives. Back migration from socialist countries has occurred for labor motives, and also emigrants to the US and Canada have returned since the rapid improvement of Korea’s economic situation.

2.7 Persecution of Korean Minorities Living in the Diaspora

Refugees and citizens living in a diaspora are more vulnerable to political circumstances and forces of change than their kinsmen living in the homeland. They can fall victim to social discrimination, marginalization, sometimes even to hate crimes and fatal violence. Some such incidents are engrained into the collective memory of Koreans.

2.8 The Massacre of Kanto Earthquake (1923)

While Korea was controlled by colonial Japan, the Great Kanto earthquake struck the Kanto Plain on the Japanese main island of Honshu on September 1st, 1923. The earthquake had a magnitude of 7.9 on the moment magnitude scale, devastating Tokyo, the port city of Yokohama and the surrounding prefectures. With widespread damage throughout the region, and an estimated number of 140,000 casualties, it is considered the greatest disaster sustained by prewar Japan. However, this
natural disaster turned into a human disaster in its aftermath: A rumor was spread that Koreans were taking advantage of the situation, committing arson and robbery, and were in possession of bombs. Anti-Korean sentiment was heightened by the Japanese’ groundless fear of possible attacks from Koreans or the Korean independence movement. In the first week of September, thousands of Koreans became the scapegoats for the panic-stricken earthquake survivors. Mobs committed mass murders of Koreans in Tokyo and Yokohama. Roadblocks were set up to seize Koreans, who were deported, beaten or killed.

2.9 Deportation of Koreans in the Soviet Union

In the Soviet Union, the first mass transfer of an entire nationality occurred in October 1937. Almost the entire Soviet population of ethnic Koreans were forcefully moved from the Russian Far East to unpopulated areas of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for the fear of penetration of Japanese espionage into the Far Eastern Krai. By October 1917, 100 thousand Koreans were living in Russia. Their allegiance in the Revolution was said to be laid mainly with the Bolsheviks, since Japan was regarded as a common enemy. Korean immigrants began submitting applications for citizenship, but the Soviets considered them politically unreliable, therefore the majority of applications were declined. By 1926, the Soviet Korean population was nearly 170 thousand people, making up over a quarter of the rural population in the Vladivostok region.

The Soviet government had approved the formation of a Jewish Autonomous District in Birobidzhan, which led the members of the Korean minority to petition for the establishment of a Far Eastern Korean National District. However, in 1929, this petition was denied. Although smaller Korean territories were authorized, and Korean language schools and newspapers were established, the Soviet government followed a contradictory policy, conceived years earlier, to resettle the Soviet Koreans away from the Eastern border.

3 Challenges to Korean Diaspora

Identity and belonging of diaspora members evolve through the generations. First generation migrants are not likely to live transnationalism in the same way as their children or grandchildren do, who were born in the country of residence. They may have no experience of their country of origin, and they may also have lost the use of their elders’ language and possibly their citizenship. However, even though the relationship between second- and third-generation migrants and their country of origin is more complex than for their elders, this relationship exists. From the perspective of diaspora engagement, it is important to promote transnationalism
for the benefit of diaspora members, as well as for the countries of origin and residence. Policies that facilitate both integration and contact with the home country are an investment towards the future, considering that social mobility of migrant children, through education and social protection, also means potentially increasing the stock of skilled labor and talent.

We are hopeful that “Hallyu”, the wave of South Korean popular culture, with a growing international export since the 1990s, will help the young generation of the Korean diaspora to reconnect with the country of their ancestors.

The government of South Korea recognizes that overseas diaspora communities and migrants are potential contributors to development through the unique experience, assets and resources that they possess. Acknowledging their value, 2.8 million expat Koreans holding Korean nationality were granted the right to vote in 2010. While respecting the status of transnational Koreans and the importance of their integration in the local community, it is our goal to encourage Korean emigrants to maintain their ties with the homeland and to uphold their Korean identity through linguistic and cultural practice.

4 Conclusion

According to UNHCR statistics, 59.5 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced in 2015. Stable concepts of home and belonging have, for a variety of reasons, become the exception rather than the rule. This has led to dramatic cultural, social and political changes and challenges. The study of diaspora and migration has evolved into a burgeoning field of research with an urgent practical relevance. A recently founded graduate university course in “Global Diaspora Studies” in Korea underlines this trend. For migrants in the diaspora to be able to live long, healthy, and productive lives and to contribute to sustainable development, the social and financial costs of migration and exposure to unfair or exploitative treatment need to be reduced. Social protection measures for migrants need to be consistently applied throughout the migration cycle to mitigate potential negative impacts and maximize the positive leverage effects of migration.

Wishing that this conference may contribute towards building a safer world for all of its citizens, I’d like to conclude my introductory overview of the Korean diaspora, past and present. I am grateful and proud of the fact that during the next two days, Germany’s top ranking university will be a platform for international scholars to share their findings on a topic of increasing importance. I would like to express my sincere thanks to our host, Georg-August-Universität Goettingen. Thank you!
Korean Language Education of *Koryo Saram*. Before and after the Collapse of the Soviet Union

*German Kim*

1 Introduction

The language of the Koreans in post-Soviet Central Asia is radically different from literary languages of South and North Korea. During more than 150 year-long residence of Koreans in the dominating Russian language environment *Koryo mar* appeared – the language of the Korean Diaspora based on two patois of North Hamgyŏn dialect. As it is known, Korean settlers moved to the Russian Primor’ye mostly from the bordering areas of Russia Northern Province Hamgyŏn, therefore the language they spoke was a dialect used in everyday life. At the same time, beginning with the pre-revolutionary period until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Korean language, which was close to the North Korean standard language, was taught at schools and universities. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and post-Soviet states and the development of trade, economic and cultural educational ties, the North Korean variant gave place to the South Korean literary language. At present, at all schools and universities of Central Asia the Seoul standard language is taught, textbooks and dictionaries compiled in South Korea are in use and Korean language teachers are dispatched from Seoul.

*Koryo mar* has attracted the attention of a number of scholars in the Soviet Union and abroad, however, it has not been studied properly and comprehensively so far. Certain aspects of *Koryo mar* are described in the works by O.M. Kim, R.P.
King, Kho Song Moo, Kwak Chung Gu and N.S. Pak, who used written sources published in Korean and Russian at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century in their research. Also, they used recordings of Yukchín and myenčon-kilchú dialects speakers. The functioning of minority languages, Russian-Korean bilingualism and the problems of linguistic assimilation of Soviet Koreans, is of great interest to the well-known sociolinguists H. Haarmann, the South Korean Slavistic Hur Seung-chul and the local Korean scholars: Iliya Yugay from Tashkent, Nelly Pak and Swetlana Son in Almaty, who compiled more than a dozen books on bilingual problems in multiethnic nations.

The aim of the paper is an analysis of the past and present situation and topical problems related to Korean language education among Koreans in Central Asia.

2 Korean Language Education in the Former Soviet Union

The first Korean immigrants appeared in the Russian Far East during the late 1850s and early 1860s. Their number increased in the pre-revolutionary period from several dozens to some 85,000 by 1917. Koreans initially lived in separate villages, and their daily life, social relations, ethnic culture and language were almost the same as in Korea.

In the Soviet Far East, there were hundreds of Korean schools and other educational establishments with Korean as the language of instruction. Newspapers and magazines were published in Korean; there was the Korean theatre, numerous amateurs’ groups. Korean language appeared in many spheres of daily life: it was used by the community, families, and in the everyday communication of the compactly living Koreans. Shortly before the deportation, basic school textbooks were published in Korean and Russian at the end of the 19th century in their research. Also, they used recordings of Yukchín and myenčon-kilchú dialects speakers. The functioning of minority languages, Russian-Korean bilingualism and the problems of linguistic assimilation of Soviet Koreans, is of great interest to the well-known sociolinguists H. Haarmann, the South Korean Slavistic Hur Seung-chul and the local Korean scholars: Iliya Yugay from Tashkent, Nelly Pak and Swetlana Son in Almaty, who compiled more than a dozen books on bilingual problems in multiethnic nations.

The aim of the paper is an analysis of the past and present situation and topical problems related to Korean language education among Koreans in Central Asia.


4 Kim German. 한국인의 역사. 서울, 박영사 (German Kim, Korean Immigration History), Seoul, 2005.

numbering several dozens were translated into Korean. All kinds of socio-political books, brochures and classical literature were translated in large amounts into Korean. Koreans were sovietized and integrated in the new political and socioeconomic system.

2.1 Language Education of Deported Koreans in Central Asia (1937–1953)

By 1937, the Korean population was totally and forcibly deported from the Soviet Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the 1930–40s Korean as a subject called “the native language” was taught at nearly all schools with a considerable number of Korean students. During that period, due to the favorable conditions of the compact settlement of the rural Korean population, teachers, textbooks and other literature in Korean were available. However, the situation was aggravated in the mid 1950s when Korean language classes gradually started to disappear from schools. The domination of the Russian language in all spheres of life in the Soviet Union was evident; therefore, the policy of “russification” in education was of a voluntary-obligatory nature.

A part of the Korean intelligentsia was worried about the fate of the national culture and language. They wrote letters to Moscow and the republican Party-government leadership about the necessity of making decisions on many urgent issues related to the activity of Korean kolkhozes’ newspaper Lenin Kichi, Korean theatre and the education of Korean children.

Thus, by the end of the 1930s – beginning of 1950s, the history of Korean language education in Central Asia is characterized by both achievements and failures. The development of the school education among the Korean settlers was taking place in the context of their economic adaptation to the new land where the leading factor was the administrative system with regard to processes in the Soviet state. The war and the eventual victory against fascist Germany, the pressing tasks of restoring the destroyed economy, liberating the Southern Sakhalin and Korea from the Japanese colonial regime, the death of Stalin, the revelation of the personality cult and many other events influenced all aspects of of Central Asian Koreans’ education.

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7 Ким Г.Н. and Мен Д.В. История и культура корейцев Казахстана. Алматы: Гылым, 1995, 212–213.
8 Newspaper “Lenin Kichi” is one of the oldest overseas Korean newspapers. The first issue under the name “Senbong” was published 1923 in Vladivostok. After the Deportation, the name of the newspaper was changed to “Lenin Kichi”. It was changed again in 1991 and was called since “Koryo Ilbo”.
2.2 Korean Language Revival Campaign during Khrushchev Thaw

At the end of 1950s–middle of 1960s there was a campaign directed at solving some problems related to the culture and language of the Soviet Koreans. The most important demands in the letters of the Korean intelligentsia, namely the formation of a national-cultural or territorial autonomy and the creation of Korean cultural centers, were not fulfilled. The events held were of temporary character and mainly concerned with insignificant secondary aspects of the socio-cultural development of the Korean population. One of the most considerable outcomes of the initiatives undertaken by some representatives of the Korean Diaspora was to draw attention to the problems of teaching the native language.

In areas where Koreans lived compactly and had rural schools, there were a considerable number of Korean students. Thus, the Korean language and literature were re-introduced into the curriculum as separate subjects. However, the whole process looked like a short-term campaign characterized by a lack of responsibility on the side of education officials, and a lack of qualified teachers with a good command of both Russian and Korean. Additionally, didactic teaching methods, the quality of curriculums, textbooks and dictionaries were poor. Therefore, it was not possible to radically improve the situation of teaching Korean at schools.

During the following twenty years – from the mid 1960s to mid 1980s the situation of the Korean language sank into oblivion again. The only exceptions were several dozens of students and post-graduate students who learned the Korean language at the universities of Moscow, Leningrad and Vladivostok. The Korean schools that functioned during the post-war period in Sakhalin had ceased to exist by that time. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the process of losing the native language had acquired an irreversible character and it became evident not only in the sphere of education but also in everyday and family life. Koreans, especially of younger age started to communicate among themselves mostly in Russian.9

2.3 Korean Language Education in the Brezhnev Era

In the 1970s–1980s the school education of the Koryo saram finally lost its organizational specificity. The former term “schools with the Korean contingent of students” disappeared from the lexicon of the documentation of the republic, regional and district organs of education. During this period, the final integration of the urban Korean children into “Russian schools” took place, at which they were a minority.

The issues of education are closely connected to the development and functioning of the language as a whole. Changes in the ethno-language behavior of the Koryo saram were characterized by two interrelated tendencies: intensive proliferation of the Russian language and loss of the native language. The number of per-

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sons who considered Russian their native language was increasing. If one can rely on the data of the 1989 census, it turns out that 51.7% of the Korean population of Kazakhstan considered Korean their native language. Actually, the fact that they said that Korean was their native language did not mean that they could speak or write it. The same situation was observable in Uzbekistan.

3 “Perestroika-Glasnost” and Korean Language in Post-Soviet Central Asia

A new impetus of reviving the interest into the historical past, national culture and language was given by Gorbachev’s perestroika, which similarly to Khrushchev’s Thaw made it possible to discuss these sore points openly. “The ethnic renaissance” embraced all peoples of the country without exception, including Koreans. One of the priority matters of the national-cultural revival was the issue of language. Perestroika and Glasnost have caused high interest in the history, ethnic culture and national language of all Soviet peoples. At the end of the 1980s—the beginning of 1990s a native language boom was observable – numerous Korean language classes and circles were organized by the Korean cultural Centers or Korean Christian missionary churches. After becoming independent, Central Asian states opened departments of the Korean language in colleges and universities, which played a very important role in training teachers, interpreters and specialists in other spheres of activities.

3.1 Departments of Korean Language in Central Asian Universities

The opening of Korean language departments in a number of universities and colleges in Almaty, Tashkent and other cities of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was of great importance. At present, Korean language specialists are trained at the department of Oriental Studies of the Kazakh National University, Kazakh National Philological University, Kzyl-Orda University, Kazakh State University of International Relations and World Languages, Academy of the National Security Committee etc. In a number of universities and at some departments the Korean language was taught as a “foreign language” or “second oriental language”. Currently, the total number of students at Korean language departments of Kazakh universities is over or around one thousand.

In Uzbekistan, the Korean language as a major subject is taught at the Tashkent state university, Tashkent state Institute of Oriental Studies, Tashkent University of World languages, Samarkand Institute of Foreign Languages, University of


the World Economy and other higher educational establishments. The total number of students is over 600.

In Kyrgyzstan, the Korean language is taught in 12 higher educational establishments, the most important among them are Bishkek State University, Kyrgyz State University, and Kyrgyz National University. The number of Korean language students lies around 400. In the Turkmen National Institute of World Languages, Korean language is taught at the department “Oriental Languages and Literature” and in Tajikistan National University, a Korean language program was initiated some years ago.

3.2 Schools Teach Korean Language

In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Korean language is mainly taught as an elective subject. In some schools specialized in languages or in places with a large Korean population, Korean language is an obligatory subject. In Uzbekistan, Korean language is taught at 130 schools including 45 schools in Tashkent\textsuperscript{12}, in Kyrgyzstan – at 24 schools\textsuperscript{13} mainly in Bishkek. There is no data regarding the current state of Korean language teaching in schools of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan, in 1992–93s there were 20 schools with Korean language teaching, in 1995 there were 57, in 1997 there were 137, and in 2000 their number was 199\textsuperscript{14}, however, at present the number has considerably decreased. Among those schools two deserve a more detailed description:

**The Secondary School named after Dzerzhinshkyi** in the village Dal’nii Vostok of the Karatal’skii region of Almaty oblast’ is the only school in Kazakhstan where the Korean language was taught, starting from 1985. The Korean population of the village, locally trained instructors of the Korean language, KOICA volunteers, supporters of the Korean cultural center, the local municipal administration, the Karatal regional department of education and the Eskel’dy village administration – they all supported the school. The school was granted founding by Almaty Center of education; it has a special classroom with audio-visual equipment, teaching and reference literature of the native language.

**The International School-Lyceum “Dostar”** was founded in November 1999. It is situated in the center of Almaty. The ethnic composition of students is multinational, but Koreans comprise a considerable share – about one fourth. Teachers are also represented by different nationalities; the General Director of the

\textsuperscript{12} Пак В. “Перспективы развития корейского языка в Узбекистане (Proceeding of the 9th International Conference on Korean Studies)”, in *Central Asia and Korean Diaspora*. Institute of Humanities. Arabaev Kyrgyz State University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan July 1–2, 2009.

\textsuperscript{13} Абдраманов Т. “Образование как интегративный фактор во взаимоотношениях Кыргызской Республики и Республики Корея (Proceeding of the 9th International Conference on Korean Studies)”, in *Central Asia and Korean Diaspora*. Institute of Humanities. Arabaev Kyrgyz State University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan July 1–2, 2009, 33.

school is L.L. Kim. Out of 60 teachers, 9 are Koreans which is 15% of the total number of teachers. The Korean language is studied by 60 students. The school cooperates with a gymnasium of Bukpyon and they have an annual exchange program for students. In 2007–2009 three delegations of teachers and students of the “Dostar”-School visited Korea. In return, the International school lyceum “Dostar” received 4 delegations of teachers and students from Korea.15

3.3 Diaspora, NGOs and the Promotion of Korean Language Education

Special mention should be made of the purposeful work done by Korean Associations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and local Korean cultural centers.16 In the late 80s – early 90s there was a “boom” of studying native languages, and numerous Korean language courses were organized by Korean cultural centers. Korean language was taught at schools as an optional subject.

According to the data of the Association of Koreans of Kazakhstan from 1992 about 3000 people studied the Korean language; in 1994 at least 5000. This increase of students with an interest in studying Korean could be observed everywhere in Central Asia as well as in the cities of Russia with a significant Korean population.

However, despite considerable success in Korean language teaching a number of issues remained: First, one should mention that the boom of Korean language studying has ended and quantitative indications have failed to turn into qualitative, i.e. for the majority of Koreans, short term interest in their “native tongue” ended without any result.

The results of some pilot questionnaires rotated among Koryo saram by Korean Diaspora Associations in Central Asia show the desire to regenerate their native language as the basis of their ethnicity. A large number of respondents have taken advantage of the opportunity to study the current native language. An even larger number of respondents wanted to study the Korean language themselves and consider it a necessity for their children to know the language. The significance of the revival of the Korean language is reflected in the fact that the majority of the respondents (over 80%) considered it a priority to develop an educational system in Korean, to publish literature and to broadcast radio and TV programs in Korean.17

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15 Интервью с Л.Л. Кимом, 2009.
17 Хан М. М. “Язык и этническое самосознание корейцев Казахстана”, in Кунсткамера. Этнографические тетради. 1996, Вып. 10, 45.
South Korean Efforts in the Korean Language Education in Central Asia

The government of South Korea pays great attention to the issues of Korean language education of Koryo saram in Central Asia. The important actors involved in the process of Korean language education in Central Asia are:

- governmental centers of education;
- agencies such as the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA);
- foundations – Korea Foundation (KF), Korea Research Foundation (KRF);
- research and educational establishments, for instance: Academy of Korean Studies, National Institute of International Education Development (NIIED), Sejong schools etc.
- South Korean missionary churches and NGOs;
- individuals

The Centers of Education of the Republic of Korea in Central Asia were established in 1991 in Almaty, in 1992 in Tashkent and in 2001 in Bishkek. These institutions, supported by the South Korean government, play a very important role in teaching the Korean language to Central Asian Koreans and in training Korean language teachers.18

About 15,000 people studied at the Center of Education in Tashkent when it operated, attended free courses of training and advanced training of Korean language teachers, training of interpreters, beginners’ and advanced courses of the Korean language, trainee courses for working migrants in small and medium size enterprises in South Korea. The Center of Education of the Republic of Korea holds annual seminars for Korean language teachers, field seminars, Korean language Olympiads, Korean folk festivals, where young participants compete in singing, dancing or dramatic reading. Lecture rooms of the Center of Education can accommodate up to 800 students at the same time. There is a library, a video room, two computer rooms, an auditorium for 200 people, and a dormitory for 40 people for those who come from oblasts.

The Center of Education renders assistance to the teachers and students providing teaching aids, teaching and methodological literature, instructional technologies. During its existence the Center of Education granted 40,000 textbooks and more than 10,000 books for children, stereo systems, audio and video equipment, 3000 sets of Korean national dresses to the teachers and students of the Korean language. The center of education sent at least 500 students and people working in the field of education in Uzbekistan to study courses at the Seoul National University and at the State Academy of the Korean language.19

Centers of education were established by the government of the Republic of Korea first of all for Central Asian Koreans, although their doors were open for all those wishing to study the Korean language. At the beginning, Koryo saram made the majority of students, however, at present the bulk is represented by other nationalities. According to the 2008 data of the Center of Education under the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Almaty, the share of students according to ethnicity were divided as follows: Kazakhs: 70–75%, Koreans: 20–25%, others: 5–10%. In Tashkent the share of Koreans with 30–35 per cent was a bit higher.20

The Korean Agency for International Cooperation – KOICA – was established in 1991 as a separate structure that was realizing the program of gratuitous cooperation in the name of the government of the Republic of Korea aiming at developing friendly relations and mutual exchange between Korea and foreign countries.

KOICA programs are divided into three directions: firstly, sending KOICA volunteers to Central Asian states, secondly, activities based on intergovernmental projects and thirdly, sending trainees from Central Asia to educational training courses in Korea.

KOICA has made a considerable contribution to the development of Kazakhstan amounting up to 10,2 million dollars. Most of the money was meant for the development of science and education. During its period of activity in Kazakhstan, KOICA sent more than 400 people, including governmental officers, researchers and other specialists, to South Korea to attended different seminars and trainings. At the same time, 108 Korean volunteers came to Kazakhstan. At present, 4 Korean doctors (surgeon, general practitioner, dentist and specialist in oriental medicine) and about 30 volunteers (mainly Korean language teachers and also programmers, ecologists etc.) work in Kazakhstan on the basis of a KOICA program. The Agency opened a Computer Center under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhstani-Korean hospital of Friendship.21 In 2009 KOICA sponsored the creation of a multimedia classroom for the department of Korean Studies at the Kazakh National University, and granted teaching and reference literature in Korean language and Korean studies in the year 2010. The books it provided were published by Korean universities and are the most modern versions of books for studying Korean.22

Sejong School of the Korean Language. Schools named after King Sejong known as “Sejong hangyl bakkyo” were opened in the countries of Central Asia after

20 Интервью с Канг Санг Чхолем – директором Центра Просвещения при посольстве Республики Корея в Алматы и Ким Чхон Соком – директором Центра Образования при посольстве Республики Корея в Ташкенте.
22 Материальная помощь KOICA. http://www.kaznu.kz/ru/3648/.
a very successful experience in Mongolia and Vietnam where they attracted a large number of people wishing to study Korean. Bishkek Humanitarian University opened the “Sejong School” for teaching Korean mainly through studying the culture of the Korean people. This school also promotes the development of cultural and humanitarian cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the Republic of Korea. Similar schools were opened in Tashkent and Almaty but they duplicate the activities of the Korean Center of Education, which has been teaching the Korean language for about two decades.

**South Korean Churches and NGOs.** At the initial stage of raising interest in their native tongue in Almaty, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe and other cities, Korean missionary churches made their contribution to organize Korean language classes and courses. In many regions, pastors of churches cooperated with the leaders of Korean cultural centers, for instance, the South Kazakhstan branch of the Association of Koreans of Kazakhstan successfully cooperated with pastors from South Korea. They agreed that every church would support one school where it would equip a Korean language classroom and ensure Korean language teaching. In Dzhambylskaya oblast’, Korean was taught at language courses in missionary churches and at the private art school “Arirang”. Korean was also taught in kindergartens and Sunday schools. For instance, in Kzyl-Ordinskaya oblast’, Korean language groups were opened in 4 pre-school institutions. In Dzhankyzgan branch, Korean is taught in the Palace of schoolchildren and in the Sunday school in Satpaev city. In Karaganda, three Korean language groups functioned in the charity mission of “Grace” church.

**4 Present Status of Korean Language and Socio-Linguistic Features of Koryo Saram**

Before the deportation of Koreans to Central Asia and the liquidation of the education system in their national language, Korean had been considered one of the languages of the people of the USSR. For a long time, the Korean language existed mainly in its oral, colloquial form and had no official status. Nevertheless, in the Soviet statistics on publications it was referred to the group “Languages of the peoples of foreign countries”. This, to a certain extent, corresponded with the objective reality as books published in Korean were mainly socio-political, classical Russian and Soviet literature translated into the North Korean language standard.23

As the Korean language was not taught at the Soviet schools and is not taught now at schools in Central Asia as a separate academic subject, its status as a language of a national minority is radically different from the status of the German

language, which has always been classified as “a foreign language”. The German language as an academic subject is taught at schools and universities.

The Status and Nature of “the Native Language” in case of Korean. The Korean language has the status of a “native language” of the Koreans of Central Asian countries, its functional usages are quite limited. In Kazakhstan, for example, there is one weekly newspaper, one 20-minute radio program three times a week and one weekly 30-minute TV program; in the field of arts: Korean theatre; in literature: 1 to 2 books with short novels or poems; in education: Korean departments in some universities and colleges.

What is the nature of “the native language” of the Korean Diaspora of Kazakhstan? The language of their ancestors and the people of the oldest generation is a unique dialect, which roots go back to the 15th century. In everyday life and also in linguistics this dialect is called Koryo mar and its present state is very close to lethal. Koryo mar in Central Asia and in other countries of the post-Soviet space is doomed to oblivion and it is not possible to re-animate it today. Thus, speaking about “the native language” one should mean the Seoul standard of the modern literary language which for the Korean children in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan is none the less “foreign” – as much as English or Arabic. Then we can speak about the modern literary Korean as “a genetically native language” or if we translate it from English precisely “a hereditary language”. Thus, we will speak not about the revival but about learning of the “national”, “genetically native”, “hereditary” etc. in other words, a different language which only 10 years ago was not known in Kazakhstan.

Using the socio-linguistic terminology of H. Kloss we can speak about Koryo mar as a specific form of a “roofless dialect” (referring to the German term “obdachlos”) as opposed to the dialects of the Korean peninsula having “a roof”, protection on the side of the literary Korean, the dialect of the Koryo saram separated from the language nucleus is deprived of such protection.24 The alien ethnic environment, and the laws of language contacts have led to many loans from the Russian and other languages in the lexical fund of Koryo mar. Koryo mar practically has no written form, it is not present in radio programs or on theatre stages, it is not used in mass media or taught at schools, it is dying. In 15–20 years there will be no more speakers of this unique linguistic phenomenon.

We should consider, at least in general, the existing ethno-linguistic situation of the Koreans of Central Asia with regard to language competence, language behavior and language orientation. The language competence becomes evident in the level of command of this or that language. If we compare the level of command of Korean, Russian and local languages in Central Asia, it becomes clear, that for the

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24 The differences between various provincial dialects are not very strong in modern Korean, although the dialects are still more or less existent. Official colloquial language standard of North Korean state was basically formed by Pyongyang area way of pronunciation. The South Korean colloquial language standard was formed by so-called Seoul dialect. The use of dialect-specific words is strictly restricted to the everyday speech.
The absolute majority of the Koryo saram Russian is the primary language. 90–95% of Koreans can use it freely. Actually, there are no children or adult Koryo saram who cannot speak Russian. The share of Koreans who can master Kazakh language well is 2–3% of the total number.

**The Korean Language Competence of Koryo saram.** To a great extent, changes in the language competence were depended on the attitude of the Soviet Koreans themselves who were not at all eager to preserve and develop their language and cultural heritage. The Koreans demonstrated a stable interest in learning Russian because it could pave the way to their further careers. Such accelerated shift to the language code of the dominating ethnic environment is characteristic for all foreign Korean Diasporas as a whole. It is a typical feature that shows a high level of acculturation and language assimilation. The Russian language began to dominate the Korean language usage already in the 1950s–1970s and the process had been going on for the following twenty years. The function of Korean language was getting more and more limited, and at present it is used mainly for communication within the families and between the elder generations.

The census data revealed a decrease in the share of Koreans who admitted that Korean was their native language: in 1959–68.6%, in 1970–64%, in 1979–56.1%, and in 1989–51.7%. However, it should be again noted that the ability to speak Korean because it is the native language does not mean that it is used in everyday life. A language is not only a universal means of communication, transfer of information etc. It is part of and a symbol for the ethnic conscience. Therefore, recognizing the Korean language as a native language is also the result of ethno-psychological factors, which ethnic identity revealed according to the saying: “I am Korean—the Korean language is my native language”. The socio-linguistic researches carried out lately among the Korean Diaspora confirmed the a priori conclusion of the nonconformity of the objective language competence with the subjective recognition of a language as the native language.

The language competence and the character of the language behavior differ with regard to age and social affiliation within the groups of the Korean Diaspora in Central Asia, which is proven by the data of the questionnaires and censuses. In the age group up to 25 years the overwhelming majority of Koreans cannot speak Korean at all. The age group of 25–60 years is characterized by a passive command of the language; they can understand simple everyday topics. Only the oldest age group of 70–90 years, who lived in the ethno-compact rural environment and learned the basics of the written national language, can speak and write in Korean to a certain extent. For generations of the Koreans who were born and socialized in Central Asia, the native language is Russian and for the majority of the deported generation who can be referred to as bilinguals in a certain sense, Russian has become the primary and Korean the secondary language.

Concerning the differentiation of the language competence according to social status, we can distinguish two groups: intellectual and physical labor, the first one, without any doubt, is behind the second in terms of Korean language competence.
Physical labor is characteristic for the Koreans in the agrarian sector and, as is well-known, in villages (or: rural areas) the ethno-homogenous reservoir, ethnic culture and language is better preserved as in an ethnically mixed urban “melting pot”. Among intellectuals the language competence was preserved and developed by those who, by their profession, were working either for the Korean language mass media (newspaper, radio, TV) or at the Korean theatres.

Speaking about the level of competence in the Korean language one should bear in mind that a small part of the modern Korean Diaspora in Central Asia is composed of Sakhalin Koreans and some former North Koreans. Their knowledge of the Korean language is significantly different from that of the majority of Koreans. Representatives of this group used to hold the leading positions in the Korean institutions of culture, art and literature due to their knowledge of the literary Korean.

Topical Problems of Korean Language Education in Central Asia. First of all, it should be noted that there is a sharp decline in the interest of learning the language. If in the past there were too many of those willing to attend the language courses, five or six years later many of them became doubtful about that decision. Strange as it might seem, it is Korean parents who think that there is no point in spending time and efforts for their children learning the language as it is not demanded anywhere today.

The lack of highly qualified teachers is still acute. Korean pastors and KOICA volunteers are rendering assistance, first of all as native speakers of Korean, but there is a need in local teachers, graduates of Korean departments who know both the language itself and the teaching methods very well. Another problem is that after graduation the best students work as interpreters in companies because university teacher’s salaries are very low. However, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan teaching of Korean was resumed after half-a-century break, the initial period is marked by both achievements and problems that still demand a solution.

Despite some successes in the organization of Korean language learning, the result is still far from what is really wanted. An explosion of enthusiasm and interest has faded but quantitative indicators have not turned into qualitative ones. Great efforts and purpose-oriented everyday work is needed to compensate the losses in Korean language competence caused by the long period of forced oblivion.

5 Conclusion

General conclusions of the language situation among Korean Diaspora in Central Asia are as follows:

1. In the post-Soviet states of Central Asia cardinal changes in the ethnic structure of the population have taken place, their essence being a mass outflow of a Russian speaking population. In all countries, languages of native people have
acquired the status of the state language. The Russian speaking Korean population faced new language problems.

2. By force of the political, socio-cultural factors the function of the Koryo mar in the Soviet time has narrowed to the sphere of family and everyday relations. Drastic changes in post-Soviet Central Asian countries in the last two decades, relations with South Korea, a wave of the ethnic self-consciousness and activity of the Korean public organizations have stimulated interest in studying the South Korean colloquial language standard.

3. The initial boom of interest in the native language failed to turn into language competence for the majority of Koreans who started to learn Korean in the early 1990s. One can observe a difference in the motivation for learning Korean as a major among Korean students in Kazakhstan (low), Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (high).

4. Although problems in teaching and learning Korean have lost their acuteness they still remain considerable. It concerns deficits in highly-qualified teachers, lack of special textbooks, dictionaries, phrase-books meant for Russian speaking students, insufficient and ineffective help from the historical motherland which should be granted on the long-term basis according to detailed programs.

5. More effective methods of teaching Korean as a foreign language must be developed and textbooks must be written with contents designed for specific purposes. It is important to support efforts in different countries to produce their own teaching methods and texts suited to local circumstances and people.

6. For an adequate understanding of the language situation among the Koreans of different Central Asian countries and in order to make correct decisions for rendering support it is necessary to carry out ethno-linguistic research. The previous experience of questionnaires and polls was far from being scientifically correct.

7. Korean associations, cultural centers, Diaspora oriented mass media do not pay sufficient attention to the issues of teaching Korean, they lack long-term programs of studying the “native tongue”, they have handed over this issue to university departments and other local or Korean actors.

8. The government of South Korea and South Korean companies, NGOs, and missionary churches based in Central Asian countries can make their contribution to the export of the Korean culture including the mass culture (TV dramas, pop music, comic books, and computer games). This can increase interest in Korean language and provide opportunities to study it by alternative, more motivational and effective means.
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Koreans in Turkmenistan: History and Modern Situation

Ogulgerek Nazarova

1 Introduction

Back in history, the first ethnic Koreans in Central Asia were violently moved from Far East. The decision No. П151/734 by the “Politburo” of the Soviet Communists Party’s Central Committee was ordered on August 21st, 1937 to begin eviction of Koreans immediately and finish by January 1938. However, this had continued until 1939. For instance, Stalin deported over 171,000–174,000 Koreans to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who formed nearly 37,000 families. Moreover, this repression had also affected those who had a Soviet Passport and who looked like East Asian because they were suspected to be Japanese spies. Maybe there were spies among them but in comparison to the total number of deported Koreans, the number of spies was very small. In Korea, I have recently met some Ethnic Koreans from Uzbekistan. One of them told me that one of his relatives was a spy who worked for the Japanese espionage in the Soviet Far East. Moreover, this goes with the testimony by Tyan Yen-Din that: “In the Far East arrested groups of the Japa-
nese saboteurs disappearing among Koreans, and People’s from NKVD revealed the Korean organizations cooperating with Japan.”

2 Historical Background

Before the 1950s there was no relationship between Turkmens and Koreans. After Koreans were violently moved from the Far East, there were prohibited to move freely and to reside in the cities. Therefore, it is hard to tell when exactly they moved to Turkmenistan and until now we do not have any written proof to support these allegations. However, we can suppose that they were moved just after the deportation of Koryoin from Far East. Since end of the 1940s ethnic Koreans have been living in the northern part of Turkmenistan. Also, Kim Vyacheslav, who was born in 1950 in Turkmenistan told me that: “Our family came to Koneurgench in the 1950th. In Turkmenistan were born two of us - me and my younger sister but the elder brother and sister were born in Uzbekistan. From 1950th we are living here and already on a territory of Turkmenistan living the 4th generation of Koreans.”

This conversation with Kim Vyacheslav will be important proof that in 1950 Koreans already lived in Turkmenistan.

The Turkmenistan state committee of statistics shows, that in 1959 there were 1919 Koreans residing in our country. Furthermore, in 1995 a total of 3159 Koreans were residents of Turkmenistan. That was a 0.07% of the total population of the Republic. Looking at the statistics it becomes obvious that the number of ethnic Koreans decreases due to low birthrates and immigration to other countries. For example, in the statistics by the Ministry of foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, the number of ethnic Koreans living in Turkmenistan was about 1.060 in 2014.

Not only the issue of movement but also the collapse of the USSR brought new problems to the Soviet Koreans. For instance, the economic crisis struck all inhabitants of the Soviet republics. In addition, Koreans of Central Asia faced increasing discrimination on a national level. In this regard, they appeared in almost identical situations with all Russian-speaking populations of the region. The new regime reserved places in state governmental machinery and army for the representatives of the “title” nation. Discrimination and impoverishment within the region led to mass departure of Koreans from Central Asia. Therefore, the number of Koryoin in the Republic of Korea is small. Not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union, after the cancellation of a dual citizenship of Turkmenistan

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4 Conversation with Kim Vyacheslav (citizen of Turkmenistan) January 28, 2016.
5 State committee on statistics of Turkmenistan (http://www.stat.gov.tm/).
many in 1995 non-Turkmen nationals left the country forever. At the same time a lot of Koreans went to Russia or other Central Asian countries.

After the establishment of deep diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and Turkmenistan, the Korean embassy in Turkmenistan tried to support ethnic Koreans in wide spheres. For example, the Korean embassy provides a number of scholarships that enables them to study in Korea. As it was before, no matter where they are, Koreans try to help each other. This situation also occurs in the Republic of Korea. In the Southern part of Gwangju (광주), Korea there is a village of ethnic Koreans (고려인 마을)⁸. Ethnic Koreans from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are compactly living there. From Turkmenistan, there are only 9 Koreans studying and working in the Republic of Korea. I know some Turkmenistan Koreans who are studying in the Republic of Korea and most of them are relatives. They are usually choosing Kyung Hee University or Hankuk University of Foreign Studies for study. There, they study among a lot of other students from Central Asian countries. This shows that Ethnic Koreans are ready to help each other or are willing to receive help in a difficult situation.

3 Contemporary Situation

In 2010 the first South Korean “Hyundai Engineering Co., Ltd” company won the “Gas Desulfurization Project”⁹ in South Yoloten, Turkmenistan. This provided a good opportunity to get a job for those ethnic Koreans who were able to speak a little Korean at that time because the company needed translators to communicate with Turkmen employers. The overall salaries of companies in Turkmenistan are two or three times higher than state enterprises. Beside translators, they were also looking for cooks. At first, South Koreans found it difficult to eat Turkmen food because no place in the country served Korean panchans “반찬”, which Koreans usually eat three times a day with their main Korean food. Fortunately, ethnic Koreans are still able to cook traditional Korean food such as panchans. Even though, it is difficult to find cabbage material for Chimchi (Central Asian Kimchi) which is not produced in Turkmenistan, ethnic Koreans kept the secret of the old Chimchi recipe. Actually, Turkmen state shops as well as commercial shops do not sell that kind of cabbage. Only ethnic Koreans grew Chimchi-making cabbage in their own gardens. I met many middle-aged women, who worked in large Korean companies as cooks and earned enough to provide for their joint families. Moreover, Koreans are professionals in ancient rice cultivation. They are still using traditional rice growing skills.

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Today, ethnic Koreans of Turkmenistan are mostly engaged in selling Korean salad, корейский салат, which is popular and has a lot of inquiry. This salad is popular since a long time ago. It is difficult to find Turkmen people who do not like Korean salad made by ethnic Koreans. Only Koreans know the secret of how to prepare this food. They keep it a secret because they do not want to lose their dominating position in the market. However, this doesn’t mean that the new generation is engaged in those above-mentioned jobs. Kim Vyacheslav, a Turkmenistan Korean said that: “Those who are graduated from higher educational institutions are working in a different sphere of the national economy of Turkmenistan. Most of them make their individual business activity. All of us live well, nobody complains, because we do not have neither a language nor a material shortcoming problem.”

Ogulhan¹¹, a Turkmen worker at Younghwa Engineering Co LTD, a branch of the Korean company in Turkmenistan, told me that while working for the company for more than 5 years she met a lot of Turkmenistan Koreans and was always interested in their history. For instance, whenever she got an opportunity she communicated with them to answer the question that people are still asking today about why and how Koreans came to Turkmenistan?

Koreans can be encountered in all provinces of Turkmenistan but the majority of them is living in the Dashoguz province in the area of Акдепе and Конаургенч; it is also easy to meet them in the Balkan province close to Kazakhstan. This area is called “Korean Village” as 70% of people living there are Turkmenistan Koreans. Those ethnic Koreans, that Ogulhan met, were mostly married to Turkmens or Russians. Ogulhan thinks that because of these international marriages they give their children Russian names. For example: Kim Kolya, Lim Andrey, Lee Yelena, etc. However, we find other regions where Turkmenistan Koreans do not practice international marriage. For example, in Dashoguz city, a place that consists of 90% Turkmenistan Koreans marriages are only between Koreans, although those types of marriages are strictly observed. Due to the small number of Ethnic Koreans in Turkmenistan some fear that this might lead to the “marriage of relatives”. In this case, the couple tends to produce a prematurely born baby due to genes problems.

As the number of ethnic Koreans decreases year by year, this problem will certainly grow worse. Mikhail Kan¹², a Turkmenistan Korean studying in Korea, told me that marriages between Koreans are strictly observed because the senior generation wants to keep its traditional character. However, he has never seen a traditional Korean wedding. While listening to him, at first, I thought that they do not

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¹⁰ Conversation with Kim Vyacheslav (citizen of Turkmenistan, whose parents moved from Uzbekistan to Turkmenistan in 1950s), January 28, 2016.
¹² Conversation with Mikhail Kan (student of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), January 25, 2016.
celebrate weddings in old Korean fashion, but after talking with Darya Park13, another Turkmenistan Korean, I learned that they still celebrate the traditional Korean wedding.

With regard to preserving their traditions Kim Vyacheslav told me the following: “It is not possible to tell that all traditions when reaching the 4th generation look such as they should be. Because about 79 years we are out of our historical homeland, so many traditions, many ceremonies were forgotten by us. Of high importance is the language which we forgot. It resulted in the fact that we started going to national schools and studied in national Turkmen language. Now we communicate between Koreans in Russian and in a local state language. In contrast to our loss of language we still remember some traditions”.

Turkmenistan Koreans managed to keep three important traditional holidays. They are celebrating the first birthday of the Korean child Asyandi, Chusok (추석) and Korean New Year (설날).

As I told above, Asyandi is the first birthday of the child and in the Republic of Korea they call it Doljanchi (돌잔치). Turkmenistan Koreans call it Годик which means “One year older”. Worth noting is the Dalyab (table for the child) where the child has to choose an object which then predetermines its future career or general direction in life. For example, if the baby choses a book that means that he/she will study well, If the baby chooses money – he/she will become successful in business. Usually, Korean traditions remained only in houses with partly senior residents as they tend to keep the traditional ceremonies alive and pass them down to their descendants. Koreans who lived in the territory of Russia in Primorye, in the former USSR, and now in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, passed their traditions from one generation to another until now. Unfortunately, nowadays even old people do not see the necessity of keeping traditional ceremonials. This problem sharply rose in connection with a new wave of migration of Koreans in places where there is no compact accommodation of Koreans in recent years and respectively there is no person who could tell how to execute this or that ceremony. This difference can even be experienced in Central Asia.

4 Current Observations

Currently, most Koreans in Turkmenistan do not have a religion. However, at the same time it is easy to meet Koreans who are Christians and also Muslims. It is probable that most Korean Muslims are women. After their marriage with Turkmen or other Muslim men, most of Turkmenistan Korean women have to change their religion, otherwise it might be difficult for them to get accustomed to Muslim customs. However, this assumption does not apply to all Turkmenistan Koreans. For instance, Darya Park told me that she does not associate with any religion but

13 Conversation with Darya Pak (student of Hankuk University of foreign Studies), January 28, 2016.
that she feels Muslim. Moreover, she and her family go on the Hadj (Adat) pilgrimage and read prayer from the Koran as well.

Most of Turkmenistan Koreans think that they do not have a Homeland. Outside of Korea, most people consider them foreigners and in Korea they do not call them Koreans but Koryo Saram (고려사람), Koryoin (고려인) or Gyopo (also spelling Kyeopho) (교포) because they were born and raised outside of Korea. However, despite the discontent of the younger generation, the opinions of the senior generation are different from theirs and many Koreans of average age are happy with their lives. As proof we can cite examples of well-known Koreans who found a place in life. It can prove the following: The richest person in Kazakhstan and all Central Asia, 56-year-old Vladimir Kim14, Victor Tsoi – popular rock musician of the former USSR, Boris Kim – the co-owner and the chairman of the board of directors of the “Qiwi” company in Uzbekistan, Yuliy Kim15, poet, composer, bard, script writer and playwright. Yuli Kim spent his childhood in Turkmenistan but in 1954, he returned to Moscow. Part of his track record are such Soviet film hits like “Bumbarash” (in Russian- Бумбараш), “12 chairs”, “An ordinary miracle”, “Formula of Love”, “The house which built Swift”. And Kim has produced more than 500 songs. In the 20th Century, he was also engaged in musicals. These people are well known and respected by many fans.

Due to the fact that Turkmenistan is divided in 5 velayats – Ahal, Mary, Lebap, Dashoguz and Balkan in one country with many dialects which native Turkmens may not understand. In the northern part of Turkmenistan lived a large Ethnic population that only spoke Russian. Schools and high schools were Russian until Turkmenistan became an independent state. Only after the collapse of the USSR and after the first president of Turkmenistan Niyazov came to power in the Republic of Turkmenistan, the modern Turkmen alphabet was created. Schools and other education centers/organizations began to teach only in Turkmen language. from early 1990 every citizen, including Koreans, began to read and write in Turkmen language. Despite this reality, most ethnic Koreans use the Russian language, and some of them consider the Russian language their native one. Their spoken language is therefore grammatically close to the Turkmen language, so if you know some words in the Turkmen language, it is not difficult for you to build sentences in it and to communicate with Turkmen People. As someone who speaks the modern Korean language, I never had difficulties to construct sentences.

As two different countries, Turkmenistan and Korea came together after Turkmenistan became independent. The first visit was by President Roh Tae-woo

of the Republic of Korea to Turkmenistan in July of 1992. His Congratulatory Remarks to the Newly Elected President Niyazov, but from 1995 to 2007 there was no any visiting from both sides. This resulted in weakening relationships between the two countries. However, after Gurbarguly Berdymuhammedow became the President of Turkmenistan, daily relationships between the two countries got better again. Subsequently, the number of students studying in the Republic of Korea has increased.

The visit of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea to Ashgabat in May 2008 became a significant landmark in the history of bilateral relations as well. A wide range of issues related to priority trends of economic and cultural-humanitarian cooperation, the creation of a bilateral intergovernmental commission and the opportunities of learning the Korean language at one of the higher educational establishments of Turkmenistan were discussed during the bilateral meeting with the President of Turkmenistan. The results of this meeting led to the opening of a Korean Language Department at the Institute of World Languages named after Dołvetmanmet Azady on September 2008 in Turkmenistan. It was at the Azady Institute where I first met Ethnic Koreans. They were fluent in the modern Turkmen language, Russian and few of them communicated with their family members in the old Korean language only. I met them at Korean course classes for ethnic Koreans, which received financial support by the Korean Embassy in Turkmenistan. I was able to study with them because of a shortage of students at that time. Turkmenistan Koreans wanted to learn their own language but they had financial problems. As I mentioned above, the ethnic Koreans live in the Northern part of Turkmenistan and the capital life was expensive for them, so they were not able to study in Ashgabat. You probably ask yourselves why the embassy did not organize Korean classes in Dashoguz province where a majority of Koreans are still living. The reason is that the Korean speakers (Korean professors from Republic of Korea) were teaching in the World Language Institute named after Dołvetmanmet Azady at that time which was located in the capital of Turkmenistan. However, these Korean language courses, which opened in 2010, closed in 2013 because of a shortage of students.

As we can see, the number of Turkmenistan Koreans is very small. In spite of almost all of them living in the area of velayat (province) as a compact community, they are not able to preserve their tradition and language as other Soviet Koreans for different reasons. Since 2007, the Korean Embassy in Turkmenistan tried to support Koreans and unite them in the celebration of their traditional ceremonies like Chusok and Korean New year. Of course, traditional celebrations are important but first of all we have to pay attention to the language which most of Turkmenistan Koreans have forgotten. As in other Central Asian countries, it is not easy to establish Korean organizations because the number of Turkmenistan Koreans is

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still very small. It is also difficult to connect with geographically close relatives from Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan because every citizen of Turkmenistan needs a visa to cross the border of the country. This led to a loss of the native Korean language and a further loss of culture and traditional celebrations. Moreover, the Republic of Korea and the Turkmenistan Government have to seriously confront the overall decrease in numbers of Turkmenistan Koreans.

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The *Koryo saram* in Uzbekistan and Their Relations to South Korea

*Svetlana Kim and Andreas Pacher*

1 Introduction

This text provides a broad but impressionistic overview of various aspects pertaining the ethnic Korean minority (or *Koryo saram*) in today’s Uzbekistan, with a particular focus on the diaspora’s relation to the Republic of Korea (which we interchangeably also call South Korea). We do so by questioning whether South Korea can be really seen as a “homeland” to the *Koryo saram* in Uzbekistan; we then pass on to a brief history of the *Koryo saram* in Uzbekistan until contemporary times; after this, we test often quoted assumptions of the diaspora literature by positing economic correlations between Uzbekistan and South Korea; in the end, we look at how South Korea has been discursively and institutionally acting vis-à-vis the *Koryo saram* in Uzbekistan in the recent years. We conclude by saying that there is some evidence that the *Koryo saram* are effectively “homeless”, i.e. without a clear “home country” in the form of an existing polity, while, on the other hand, South Korea seems to be strategically positioning itself as a substitute of a home country presumably for economic and political gains. While none of the following subchapters claims rigorous scientific validity, the text can still serve as a broad review of *Koryo saram* matters in Uzbekistan, puts forth original assumptions about their relationship to South Korea, and helps to guide future research into an often-overlooked direction.
2 A Vacuum in the Diaspora Definition

What happens if we confront, on the one side, scholarly works on diaspora studies, which systematically breeds analytical frameworks enshrining formalistic terminologies, with, on the other side, the literature of the Koryo saram, whose belles lettres and memoirs abound in an emotionally dense search for identity?

*Koryo saram* are intuitively labeled as diasporas; the numerous definitions of what constitutes a “diaspora” can be summarized into three criteria: (1) dispersion; (2) boundary-maintenance; and (3) homeland orientation (Brubaker 2005, 5–6).

Subsuming the *Koryo saram* under this three-element definition may seem straightforward. Ad (1), dispersion, one can simply state that the ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan live outside the borders of their ancestral dwellings on the Korean peninsula. Ad (2), boundary-maintenance, one can find that they have been able to maintain their own customs and cultural institutions – such as their own journals “Edinstvo” and “Koryo sinmun”, their own theatre (founded in Khorezm in 1949) or their ethnically exclusive group “Kayagym” (established in 1969) in the State Uzbek Philharmonic Orchestra (Khan and Yong 2013). All of this makes them a community clearly distinguishable from the rest of the host country’s population.

However, if we talk about the criterion of homeland orientation (3), the exercise of subsuming *Koryo saram* under this definition encounters a little problem. The criterion is about “sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, 497) or about a “[caring] in some manner about the well-being of the homeland of the ancestors” (Tölöyan 2012, 11). What do the words written in the literature of the very *Koryo saram* themselves say about this, a literature in which deracination, estrangement, and a disoriented search for identity are dominating topoi (S. Kim 2015)?

In Vladimir Li’s story “Dve vetvi odnogo dereva”, an old Korean man, long after deportation to Uzbekistan, finally satisfies his long-cherished wish and travels back to the beloved places of his childhood in the Russian Far East; he ends up in horror about the emptiness and lifelessness of the villages. Drawing a lesson from this, Vladimir Li finds his real home not in a geographically delineated region but rather in one’s memories. Other *Koryo saram* writers, too, refrain from identifying a homeland ascertainable on geographical maps; they find their habitat in an unworldly detached, almost spiritualized sphere. Anatoly Kim confesses that his native land is located in his much-treasured activity of writing; Mikhail Pak assumes that home is simply where one feels happy; and after much struggle, Vladimir Kim acknowledges that he is, in the end, nothing but homeless (S. Kim 2015, 41). Similar stances can be observed among commoners in Uzbekistan.1

If we take these utterances from the *Koryo saram* themselves seriously, we cannot assert so quickly that the *Koryo saram* have a clear homeland. Yes, the first two

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definitional elements of a “diaspora” are clearly fulfilled. But what is the Koryo-saram’s “homeland”? Scholarly literature, tacitly or expressly, often fills this vacuum with a taken-for-granted substitute, i.e. South Korea, for instance when Oh (2006, 123) observes, that “now the Korean diasporas have a relatively modernized homeland that has the economic means to support them”. However, this is far from self-evident; the majority of Koryo saram originate from the Northern part of the peninsula; and even South Korea itself struggles with its “insecurity of national identity” (Bedeski 1994, 78). It would also be wrong to state that a unified “Joseon” – the Kingdom that existed until 1897 – is their homeland (like in the case of the Zainichi Koreans who were registered under the Joseon nationality under Japanese Registration Law 1947, cf. T. H. Kim 2015; Yau 2009, 157).

Can the notion of “stateless diasporas” (Sheffer 2003) help us here? Theorists claim that stateless diasporas’ activism on homeland politics lasts significantly longer than in other cases, namely as long as the nationalist struggle continues (Sheffer 2003, 152–153), often with “rather radical approaches” (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009, 19) because “tendencies to assimilate and integrate into the host society are counterbalanced by their strong sentiments for the homeland” (Sheffer 2003, 153). – Does this apply to the Koryo saram? According to our knowledge, there is no instance of collective, far-fetched political involvement of the Koryo saram with “homeland” politics – in whatever political boundaries we define the term here. Thus, we either have to contradict Sheffer, a renowned professor emeritus from Jerusalem, or we have to venture into cautiously stating that the Koryo saram are not only not a “stateless diaspora”, but perhaps not a “diaspora” at all.

Yet we feel that an outright denial of a diasporic character of the Koryo saram in Uzbekistan is not completely satisfying. We certainly cannot negate the gap in the definitional elements, the vacuum left behind by the unfilled “homeland” criterion; apparently, South Korea is, as we stated, often almost intuitively seen as the substitute-homeland. There might be a diplomatic strategy behind it, in which South Korea was successful in benefitting from the gap by appealing on ethnic kinships, using the definitional cavity as a hole through which it deliberately slipped to enter the economic, political and diplomatic area in Uzbekistan.

Whatever the answer is – let us take a quick glance on how this literature-vouched feeling of homelessness developed in the historical context.

3 History and Present

Beginning in 1863, Koreans from mostly Northern Korean regions fled hunger (and later, Japanese expansion), crossed the Tumen River and settled in the Russian Far East. After waves of naturalizations, they grew to become a considerable regional minority. Hostilities between Japan and Russia near the Chinese border in the first half of the 20th century made them suspicious of espionage. Stalin thus had them – about 180,000 ethnic Koreans – deported to Central Asia in 1937, a
majority of them to today’s Uzbekistan. They were settled in agriculturally arable lands such as in Chirchiq, Tashkent, Khoresm, Samarkand, Karakalpakstan or in the border regions near the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers where new Korean villages were established. Poor conditions did not allow proper accommodations, which led to a deterioration of the health situation; the elderly and the children suffered most. A 1938 census indicates that 1,500 Koreans had died within the first months, and memoirs and other kinds of Koryo saram literature include endless strings of sad experiences. Families were divided during the deportation, children lost their parents, and the Soviet policy of restricting mobility did not make the reunification of families any easier (G. Kim 1993). In periods of renewed russification policies, the Koryo saram were able to soon cope with the vicissitudes by making use of their rice cultivation experience. During the rest of the Soviet Union, their overall situation was gradually enhanced, emerged to be one of the most educated Soviet minorities (Haarmann and Holman 1997) boasting recognition by having celebrities among their ranks and by means of various Soviet honorary titles (Suh 1988).

The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the abolishment of mobility restrictions, but it also gave rise to economic difficulties. The newly independent Central Asian countries endorsed nationalist policies, which edged off the Koryo saram since they generally spoke only Russian instead of the suddenly prioritized national language. Thus, a wave of Koryo saram emigration commenced, often following the opposite route from that taken before 1937: Many have gone to Russia, some even “back” to the Far East, where Korean villages were (re-)established (Buttino 2009, 738). The number of Koreans in Uzbekistan decreased from 183,140 in 1989 to 147,700 in 2008. This overall demographic trend continues, while the Korean minority in Russia has kept growing in the past years to reach more than 210,000 today (Khan and Yong 2013).

Interestingly, South Korea has become another attractive destination for Koryo saram from Uzbekistan (Saveliev 2010, 491). Bilateral treaties have attracted thousands of Koryo saram migrant workers to South Korea based on yearly quotas. Uzbek citizens mostly migrate as seasonal guest workers using the working visa H2 for three years and the visa F4 for five years if they have diploma and Korean language skills. More than 20,000 Uzbek citizens emigrated to South Korea during the period 1991–2015; it is assumed that around 15% of them were Koryo saram (Lim 2009; Ten 2014, 71). In the 2000s, the annual number of Russian speaking Koreans emigrating to South Korea accounted for at least two thousand and showed a growing trend (Ten 2014, 75–76). This intriguing twist of “re-migration” perpetuates their “history of permanent territorial and social mobility” in which they “can be called eternal wanderers” (G. Kim 2009, 65).

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2 The yearly quota of guest workers for Uzbekistan changes regularly, for 2016 it is 7,000 visa.
4 Language

Almost every Koryo saram who arrived in Uzbekistan in 1937 spoke Korean. It was a specific dialect called Koryo mar, which points towards the northeastern part of the Korean peninsula, namely Northern Hamgyŏng and Southern Hamgyŏng (Kho 1987). Their Koryo mar preserved archaic-sounding elements and developed linguistic particularities as a result not only of their isolation from modern Korean literature, but also through absorption of elements from Uzbek, Russian and the southern Korean dialect (Kim 2004). After deportation (in which teachers and students usually arrived and settled together), Korean schools continued to function in Uzbekistan; 95% of the Koryo saram children attended such schools. But this lasted only a few months, for Soviet education policies soon made Russian the main language of schooling.

The outstanding effect of Russification policies are manifested in the fact that just 40 years later only half of the 400,000 Koreans in the Soviet Union regarded Korean as their first language (Suh 1988). In 1989, a large share of the younger generation of the 180,000 Koreans in Uzbekistan did not know Korean at all, whereas just 50% of them were able to use the language at least in daily life – speaking and writing skills had already become very rare (Rakhmankulova 2014). Their original dialect is barely spoken today; only 60 to 80-year-old Koryo saram in Uzbekistan still use it. The young generation does not know the language at all, not even passively. If they learn Korean today – roughly 10% of the young generation – they learn the Seoul dialect Changuk mal’ (Ten 2013).

This is an interesting twist that has a nexus to the political context. Soon after Uzbekistan’s independence, diplomatic ties between South Korea and Uzbekistan were established in 1992. Agreements on cooperation regarding technical, educational and scientific areas were signed in which the promotion of language courses (of course based on changuk mal’) played a central role (Khan and Yong 2013). Engagement only deepened after the Asian Financial Crisis. The “Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative” – mainly eying Central Asian energy resources – was adopted by the South Korean government under President Roh Moo-hyun in 2006. It envisaged a “full exploitation of bilateral relations” (Ko 2009), that is, cultural aspects like language exchanges included. Roh’s successor followed the same path. President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Tashkent in 2009 was highlighted by the signing of sixteen deals, mainly on energy matters, and the two governments endorsed a “New Silk Road” (Joon 2009); these high-level negotiations were accompanied by a Korean Culture Festival and other cross-culture programs (Miyamoto 2009, 49). His successor President Park Geun-hye’s “Eurasia Initiative”, first outlined when Seoul hosted the “Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia” conference in 2013, incorporates a similar vision (Fumagalli 2016, 43).
The magnitude of South Korea-sponsored activities of the Koryo saram in Uzbekistan\(^3\) shed light on the soft power diplomacy, which goes hand in hand with the economic ties between the countries. The ethnic Koreans are explicitly brought out as “key players in bridging South Korean and Central Asian cultures and in strengthening relations at the grass-roots level” (Miyamoto 2009, 56). As a result, numerous Uzbek institutions teach Korean language today to around 12,000 students, and the South Korean government aids them not only in financial terms but also through other means like exchange programmes of voluntary language teachers (Rakhmankulova 2014).

South Korea’s soft power strategy, which is based on promoting Korean pop culture, was certainly successful in Uzbekistan. As we saw, the younger generation of Koryo saram turned their back to their “native” northern Korean dialect to embrace, instead, the South Korean language – if they learn the language at all. This leads to our observation that perhaps South Korea instrumentalizes the ethnic kinship of the Koryo saram as a convenient shortcut to get facilitated access to the political and economic playground in Uzbekistan. The gateway they use is the void that looms in the homeland criterion of diaspora definitions; in other words: South Korea pretends to be the historical and future “homeland” for the Koryo saram.

5 Win Through Kin: Five Correlations that Indicate Economic Relevance

We may test this observation by looking at commonly identified diaspora impacts towards their homeland. We now explicitly substitute “homeland” with South Korea. The literature almost unequivocally attributes positive economic effects to the presence of ethnic kinships in bilateral relations between the country of residence and the ancestral homeland. This was found true in terms of remittances (World Bank 2016), international trade (Rauch 2001), FDI (Leblang 2010) and, to a lesser extent, ODA (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Bacqué 2016), mostly due to cultural familiarity, higher trust towards co-nationals, and a shared language, which altogether diminish transaction costs. Empirical studies have shown that this applies to Koreans as well (e.g. Tait 2003, 314; M. J. Kim 2015; S. J. Kim 2003).

The following graphs\(^4\) allow us to observe economic patterns in the relations between South Korea and Central Asian countries. We sort the latter on the x-axis according to their current approximate Korean “diaspora” size from left to right: Turkmenistan with 438 Koreans, Tajikistan with 1.762, Kyrgyzstan with 18.810,

\(^3\) There is not enough room to enumerate the activities; they are often to be found in reports of the South Korean embassy in Tashkent. https://www.embassypages.com/korearepublic-embassy-tashkent-uzbekistan, but also on other websites such as http://koreis.com/main/06_koreis/news_list.asp.

\(^4\) Source: Own Graphics. Abbreviations: ROK = Republic of Korea; TUR = Turkmenistan; TAJ = Tajikistan; KYR = Kyrgyzstan; KAZ = Kazakhstan; UZB = Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan with 103,952, and Uzbekistan with the largest diaspora of 175,939 (Khan and Yong 2014, 185). If the abovementioned claim is valid, each graph should depict a very flat line in the beginning with only a slight rise when it reaches Kyrgyzstan, a sudden sharp surge at Kazakhstan and a peak in Uzbekistan. The dashed trendline should always show a rise to the right.\(^5\)

Table 1: Total trade flows in USD millions for Tajikistan.

![Bilateral Trade Flows with ROK (1)](image)

Table 2: Total ODA (official development aid) from 2011–2014 in South Korean Won.

![ODA from ROK (2)](image)


(2) Total ODA (official development aid) from 2011–2014 in South Korean Won, based on statistics of KOICA ([http://stat.koica.go.kr:8077/komis/jsptemp/ps/stat_index.jsp](http://stat.koica.go.kr:8077/komis/jsptemp/ps/stat_index.jsp)).

(3) Number of new Korean enterprises 1997-2015 (regarding Turkmenistan: only data for 2007 available), based on Korean Export-Import Bank ([http://211.171.208.92/odisas_eng.html](http://211.171.208.92/odisas_eng.html)).


(5) FDI in USD thousands 1997-2015 (except for Turkmenistan: only data for 2007 available), based on Korean Export-Import Bank ([http://211.171.208.92/odisas_eng.html](http://211.171.208.92/odisas_eng.html)).

Table 3: Number of new Korean enterprises 1997–2015.

Table 4: Total remittances 2013–2014 in USD millions, based on World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Data.

Table 5: FDI in USD thousands 1997–2015, based on Korean Export-Import Bank.
Contrary to our expectation, some peaks are reached in Kazakhstan, which, however, does not nullify our assumption, for intensive Kazakh-Korean relations are attributable to Kazakhstan’s own economic growth and size (e.g. regarding lower ODA and higher FDI; see Fumagalli 2016, 43).

Far from asserting causation, but rather restricting ourselves to mere prima facie impressions for our purposes, we can observe a correlation between the presence of an ethnic Korean minority and close economic ties to South Korea. The dashed trendlines are telling. Due to data availability issues, we are not able to quantify the exact impact of the Koryo saram’s business activities. But other works have revealed that, indeed, Koryo saram have proven to be shrewd in this respect (G. Kim 2009), and glances at documents from the South Korean embassy in Uzbekistan reveal that ethnic Korean businesses can count on support from the South Korean government (MOFA 2014). We know from other contexts as well that overseas Koreans play key roles in business ties (Tait 2003, 314; Chen 2000; Luova 2009).

Given the correlations and the scholarly knowledge about Koryo saram involvement in successful entrepreneurship, we may venture into stating that the diaspora matters – for now, at least economically. The diaspora’s political relevance is another question.

6 The Political Adoption of the Koryo saram

We borrow an analytical framework used by Faist (2008) when he found the emergence of migrant networks as development actors; a topic of relevance in view of remittances, and one of the intellectual bases for the growing bulk of diaspora studies. Faist approached the object of his study first by looking at the discursive dimension (the “new enthusiasm” for migrant networks among scholars and documents of international organizations such as the OECD and World Bank) and secondly at the institutional dimension (the emergence of collective actors of businessmen, epistemic communities and diasporas). Let us simply ask: Have the Koryo saram emerged as a relevant political “pawn” in bilateral ties between South Korea
and Uzbekistan? Let us just look at a few exemplary circumstances of the past few years.

6.1 Discursive Dimension

When South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2009, he participated in a social gathering with local Koryo saram and uttered ethnic appeals, stressing their importance in promoting Korean pop-culture – for South Korean pop culture can be seen as the “most important factor” in public diplomacy success (Dumitraşcu 2015), and explicitly made known that they are assets through which bilateral energy ties between South Korea and Central Asia can be fostered (Miyamoto 2009). Official joint communiqués between South Korea and its Central Asian counterparts did not miss to pledge development support for the ethnic Koreans in their countries (Ko 2009). Such patterns repeatedly occurred in subsequent state visits, for instance when President Park Geun-hye attended an exhibition of ethnic Koreans in Astana in 2014 (Yoong 2014) to “encourage” the Koryo saram in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Office of the President 2014).

South Korea’s “Caravan Diplomacy”, launched in 2008, has mission groups consisting of public and private actors visit resource-rich areas to simultaneously tighten official and commercial ties (Miyamoto 2009, 50). During the Korean-Central Asia Caravan in March 2016, the KIEP (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) hosted an event intended to enhance interregional think tank cooperation (MOFA 2016). A closer look at the renowned government-funded institution reveals that it had done extensive research on ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan. In a working paper from 2010 the institution urges the government to strategically support the Uzbek Korean minority and to make use of them in order to facilitate economic ties (Jae-Young et al. 2010). Concrete recommendations include education projects and the selection of Uzbekistan to be a main beneficiary country for South Korean ODA.

6.2 Institutional Dimension

The South Korean government took KIEP’s recommendations seriously and made Uzbekistan one of eleven recipient countries of ODA in 2012 (ODA Korea 2012). Obedient to KIEP’s policy suggestions, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), one of the canals through which Korean ODA is poured out, spent $4 million to establish a vocational training center in Tashkent. In total, Uzbekistan received $6 million from KOICA’s ODA programme.

We already mentioned the South Korean Caravan in Central Asia. In another institutional example, the Association of Korean Cultural Centers of Uzbekistan is highly active in various domains throughout Uzbekistan, ranging from charity to education, culture and networking; it regularly cooperates with the South Korean
Embassy in Uzbekistan (International Cultural Centre of Uzbekistan 2013. Its office hosts the desk of the journal Koryo sinmun, the scientific society Tinbo, a library, it offers Korean language courses, creates documentaries and other films together with Uzbekfilm, lobbied successfully in creating a Korean funded park in Tashkent in 2010, and participates in annual festivals in Seoul.

KIEP, KOICA, the Association of Korean Cultural Centers of Uzbekistan, KCAFA and a variety of other institutions all deal (at least inter alia) with the Koryo saram in Central Asia, of whom the majority lives in Uzbekistan. Many of the institutions are partly or wholly, directly or indirectly state-sponsored, often partaking as official hosts in high-level conferences aimed at fostering bilateral cooperation. Regional diplomatic initiatives such as the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum (est. in 2007) and the Korea-Central Asia Caravan (est. in 2011) aimed at stimulating comprehensive bilateral cooperation (MOFA 2015, 141-143) further corroborates the institutional dimension of South Korean-Uzbek relationship.

Such official attention had not been dedicated to the Koryo saram before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This changed only with the new post-Soviet mobility (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, 498; Oh 2006), the emergence of communication and transportation technologies with which a collective sense of identity can be retained more easily (Kilduff and Corley 1999, 6), the new scholarly interest in promoting the advantages of diasporas thanks to epistemic communities of “migration optimists” (Gamlen 2014) who diffused diaspora policy ideas throughout the world. This also transforms the very nature of the ethnic Koreans – they become politicized (Tölöyan 2012, 55) and utilized as an asset.

Anyway, the fragmentary glances of this chapter suffice to see that in addition to economic relevance, the Koryo saram matter politically, too, to South Korea. The discursive dimension and the soft power play reveal that South Korea conveys the message of being nothing less than the very “homeland” the ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan can rely on. The soft power diplomacy in Central Asia is a process in which South Korea increasingly intends to maintain close links to the Koryo saram, thereby filling a vacuum in what may be called a “diasporization” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007, 498). The Koryo saram, now being “adopted” by a new fatherland, are finally (quasi-)diasporized, at least to the appearance. We add this parenthized quasi because we cannot know the real inner reliability of this diplomatic game, and we cannot be bold enough yet to make statements on the emotional attachment of the people towards their new adoptive parent which instrumentalizes them as a “pawn” (G. Kim apud Oh 2006, 127).

Instrumentalized for what? Are there clear policy goals? The harmless term of “resource diplomacy”, which South Korea pursues and which sounds so depoliticized, is mute about the consequences of ever closer inter-Asian ties with what may be called “the second Middle East” (Miyamoto 2009, 45) due to the region’s vast energy resources. If South Korea thrusts itself upon Central Asian markets to assertively show presence as a growing regional power, it reshapess, albeit trifly, the balance of power in a geopolitical playing field where Russia and China dominate.
At the same time, another goal may be to unobtrusively engage North Korea and cooptively encouraging it to contribute in multilateral settings; a hidden power-play of a “Nordpolitik” (T. Kim 2015) to deliberately entangle North Korea into institutions and economic ties to heighten interdependence that makes a “liberal endurance” of peace – the very same formula that was successful in fostering the peaceful order in Europe after the Second World War (Ripsman 2005). Let us not forget where this bold excursion into august geopolitical visions had its departure from: From the Koryo saram. Thus, a group that seems so often overlooked, so unknown, so minor, may be the gateway into geopolitical shifts that unleash repercussions beyond regional relevance, which is even more true if one had the audacity to devise bold prognosis of Japan’s and U.S.’ stances in this “what-if” scenario that began with the Koryo saram in Uzbekistan. The (fledgling) diaspora is once again used as a pawn – hopefully not in a gambit⁶, though we do not know how many future moves have been premeditated by the players. Whatever chess strategy we can read in the metaphorical power play – it certainly manifests the “politicization” of a diaspora (Tölöyan 2012).

7 Conclusion

We took a superficial look at economic data; at utterances of South Korean politicians; at government-sponsored institutions that act top-down in order to instrumentalize a group of people who had collectively acted for decades from below. We proceeded by using scholarly established analytical frameworks, or by aiming at revealing correlations that were predicted in academic debates, without really looking at who the Koryo saram really are; they were reified as objects of study while remaining mute. We want to atone for this by concluding this chapter with, finally, a citation from the Koryo saram literature.

They say, being born and brought up in a foreign country cannot create any nostalgia – how can one yearn for the unknown? But in each of us, there is an ineradicable craving to know where we come from and what it is, the land of the ancestors, and who they are, the brothers in blood – are they still there? How could we satisfy our eternal desire to understand ourselves without this knowledge? (V. Kim 1997; own translation)

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⁶ Gambits are chess moves in which pawns are sacrificed voluntarily to gain an overall advantageous strategic position.
Literature


Koreaner in Kasachstan und ihr Dialekt *Yukchin*

*Nelly Pak*

1 Einleitung


Die Sprache, die von den Koreanern in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion gesprochen wird, unterscheidet sich heute deutlich von der Sprache, die auf der koreanischen Halbinsel gesprochen wird. Im Laufe von ca. 150 Jahren unabhängiger Existenz auf einem neuen Territorium – davon ca. 80 Jahre in völliger Isolation von der ethnischen Heimat – hat sich eine neue Variante des Koreanischen herausgebildet, das sogenannte *Kore Mar* (KM).

1.1 Über die Ethnonyme Kore Saram und Kore Mar

Wenn das Sprachproblem der koreanischen Gemeinde erörtert wird, sollte man sich genauer den Begriff Kore Mar anschauen. Darunter wird „die Sprache der sowjetischen Koreaner“ und auch die Kore Mar-Muttersprachler verstanden, die sich selbst Kore Saram nennen, was „sowjetische Koreaner“ bedeutet.


In diesem Zusammenhang sei daran erinnert, dass die Koreaner, die im autonomen Bezirk Yanbian (China) leben, khangukke-chungug-in „Chinesen koreanischer Herkunft“ oder chunguk-tonphko „chinesische Landsleute“ genannt werden.

In Japan sind sie als kankokukei-nikhondzin „Japaner koreanischer Herkunft“ bekannt (Konzewitch 2014; Pak 2004; Kim und King 2001).

2 Was zeichnet die Sprache der koreanischen Gemeinde – KM aus?


Der Laut [š] gehört zu den archaischen Lauten. Er ist nur für den Dialekt Yukchin typisch: šŏbakanda „heiraten“. Zu den morphologischen Archaismen gehört der Kasusaffix – ry (Dativ): na-ry dzupšol „Geben Sie mir“. Lexikalische Besonderhei-


2.1 Dialekte Yukchin und Menchon

2.2 Bildungsquellen von KM

Während der Feldforschungen (Anfang 1990er Jahre) ist es uns (R. King und N. Pak) gelungen herauszufinden, dass die DY-Sprecher 10% der koreanischen Bevölkerung ausmachten. Die anderen 90% sprachen Menchon. Im Moment kann man mit Sicherheit behaupten, dass es keine *Yukchin*-Sprecher gibt. Um die Bildungsquellen des Dialektes zu bestimmen, denken wir an das historische Schicksal der DY-Träger zurück, die drei Auswanderungsperioden erlebt haben:


2.3 KM-Forschungsstand


Die umfassende Erforschung der obengenannten Sprache ist eine der aktuellen Aufgaben der Koreanistik, besonders in Kasachstan und in Usbekistan, wo die Mehrzahl der Kore Mar-Sürecher lebt.

3 Der Beherrschungsgrad der Muttersprache von Koreanern in Zentralasien


3.1 Besonderheiten der Sprachsituation in Kasachstan


Die nationalen und sprachlichen Probleme der koreanischen Gemeinde unterscheiden sich von ähnlichen Problemen anderer nationaler Gruppen, weil die Sprache der koreanischen Gemeinde, die längere Zeit in der absoluten Isolation

4 Weitere Perspektiven von Kore Mar


Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Relevanz deutlich, die Sprache für die nächsten Generationen zu erforschen und zu dokumentieren.

5 Zu den Forschungsperspektiven:


1. Systematische Beschreibung zweier auf dem GUS-Territorium funktionierender Grunddialekte – Menchon und Yukchin und damit die Erweiterung der Sprach-/Dialektweltliste.


3. Wege zur Verbreitung vom standardisierten Kore Mar in der koreanischen Gemeinde der GUS-Länder (hauptsächlich in Kasachstan und in Usbekistan) zu finden und die ersten Versuche in diese Richtung zu starten.
5.1 Phonetik und Grammatik

Erforschung des phonetischen Systems der Dialekte Yukchin und Menchon, um die Unterschiede zu unifizieren, die Graphik und die Orthographie des standardisierten Kore Mar einem Prinzip folgend zu erarbeiten.

1. Die grammatische Struktur des standardisierten Kore Mar beschreiben;
2. Theoretische und praktische Grammatik schaffen.

Beschreibung der Grammatik der koreanischen Sprache, Prinzipien der Ausarbeitung der Orthographie und der Terminologie:

1. Die Unterschiede zwischen Yukchin und Menchon sowie auch anderen Dialekten vereinheitlichen (Phonetik, Lexik, Grammatik), das heißt, linguistische Unifizierung;
2. Es gibt große Unterschiede zwischen dem Norden und dem Süden, was linguistische Termine betrifft. Für welche sollte man sich bei der Ausarbeitung der Grammatik entscheiden? Man sollte eventuell die üblichsten in der sowjetischen und ausländischen Koreanistik akzeptieren.

5.2 Lexik

1. Den Wortschatz sammeln und in Listen anordnen;
2. Den Wortschatz der Dialekte nach thematischem Prinzip systematisieren;
3. Das komparative Wörterbuch der Dialekte erstellen;
4. Die Wege der Wortschatzbildung erforschen:
   a) Entlehnungen aus dem Russischen, aus dem Türkischen usw.;
   b) Neuen Wortschatz aufgrund Kore Mar;
   c) das Erscheinen neuer Bedeutungen für vorhandene Wörter;
   d) die Wortschatzbereicherung aus Hanguk und Chosonmal.

5.3 Dialektologische Studien

1. Materialien über Dialekte mittels der Respondentenumfrage;
2. Fragen der historischen Phonetik, der Grammatik und der Lexikologie der koreanischen Sprache im Zusammenhang mit der Dialektologie erforschen;
3. Moderne Dialekte auf der historisch-linguistischen Grundlage beschreiben;
4. Einen Kursunterricht in der Dialektologie der koreanischen Sprache, Kore Mar eingeschlossen ausarbeiten.

6 Ausarbeitung des KM-Standards

Wie oben erwähnt, stellt KM zurzeit ein kommunikatives System dar, das aufgrund der Verwicklung von zwei Dialekten gebildet wurde und keinen Standard hat. Es


In unserer Forschung betrachten wir die Koinization als einen Mischungsprozess durch den Kontakt von zwei oder mehreren Dialekten einer Sprache, der im Rahmen eines anderssprachigen Milieus zur Entwicklung eines neuen Sprachsystems führt. Dabei unterscheidet sich dieser Mischungstyp von zwei Dialekten im national homogenen Milieu prinzipiell von der Dialektmischung unter anderssprachigen Bedingungen (man nennt sie „Inseldialekte“). Wir haben hier mit dem besonderen Mischungstyp zu tun, wenn die Prozesse einerseits zwischen den Subsystemen einer Sprache, andererseits zwischen den Kontakt sprachen des Milieus erfolgen. In der Sprache der koreanischen Gemeinde Zentralasiens wirken folglich zwei Dialekte, nämlich Yukchin und Menchon, zusammen, andererseits haben diese Dialekte auch Kontakt mit dem Kasachischen/Uzbekischen. In einer bestimmten Phase kann ein neues Sprachsystem die erste gemeinsame Sprache für alle Dialekt-
träger der Gemeinde werden. Die Koinesprache wird Muttersprache für alle, die diese Sprache von Geburt an sprechen.

Im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung eines gemischten Dialektes ist es wichtig zu begreifen, ob sich ein neues „drittes“ System bildet oder ob es nur als Fall von Bilingualität erscheint, wenn zwei systemunterschiedliche Sprachen zusammenwirken. Unsere Beobachtung zeigt, dass es keine mechanische Mischung der Komponenten gibt, sondern ein Prozess der Verdrängung eines der variierenden Elemente erfolgt.


7 Bedeutung der KM-Erforschung für die Koreanistik


Es gibt noch viele Probleme, deren Untersuchung nicht nur für die koreanische Dialektologie oder für die Geschichte der koreanischen Sprache, sondern auch für die Soziolinguistik, für die Aktualisierung der Altaï-Theorie sowie auch für die Komparativforschung, die Semiotik und die Forschung der ethnischen Identität wichtig sind.
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Korean Musicians in Japan at the Interface of Two Koreas: Case Study of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan, (North) Korean Performance Group in Japan

Ae-Ran Jeong

1 Introduction

During my fieldwork¹, until I observed the two specific artists I shall discuss later, I didn’t really understand what it meant to be at the “interface” between South and North Korea. After listening to their challenges and obstacles, I began to viscerally understand what it meant to be for an artist at the interface. The unpredictable outside tensions, whether from South Korea, from North Korea or from Japan, constantly renew and redefine the possibilities and limits of artists. This presentation points to a deeper understanding of what Koen De Ceuster noted:

An interface is the in-between space between two entities, an area of not only division but also of contact. From the perspective of this in-between area, both sides are equally constitutive. By taking up a position in the interface, it is clear that each side shapes the other. The looming presence of the Other is actually recognized by its willed absence. Understanding how the Other has always been present in the definition of the Self is an important step in the process of reconciliation between the two Koreas.²

¹ The fieldwork was conducted from July 24 to September 19, 2010 and May 8 to July 1, 2012 in Tokyo, Japan (Company Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan).
The two artists in Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan, the Korean performance group founded in 1955, are located in Tokyo. The company of 50 members combines dance, song and musical instruments that particularly belong to North Korean artistic practices. The founders of the company are children of Koreans. Some arrived in Japan as forced laborers while others sought refuge during the Japanese colonial period on the Korean peninsula between 1910 and 1945. At their liberation, the approximately 600,000 Koreans remaining in Japan searched to recover their language and culture.\(^3\)

This was the beginning of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan and their mission was to research, re-establish and represent the Korean arts while claiming themselves as Koreans in Japan, to distinguish themselves from Japanese.\(^4\) The company regularly visits Pyongyang in North Korea for artistic apprenticeships and to perform for a North Korean public. To this day, the 3rd and 4th Korean descendants, born in Japan and whose mother tongue is Japanese, follow these practices. The artists of the company live in the country of their former colonizer and North Korea still has no diplomatic relations with either South Korea or Japan.

In this context, two specific artists of the company Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan, Ha Yong-Su, percussionist and Ch’oe Yong-Tŏk, changsaenap player will be examined. Investigating the obstacles, they face and how they meet the challenges, the more central question is how artists of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan play within the interrelationship between obstacles and creativity. The relationship with North Korea, the social environment in the Japanese society, the modifications of their instruments brought from North Korea, the individual artistic motivations and their exposure to South Korea are the tensions and obstacles that they face. The biographic experiences of Ha Yong-Su and Ch’oe Yong-Tŏk will be contextualized within their performative practices.\(^5\)


\(^4\) For more historical details, see the official journal of Ch’ongryŏn. Permanent Central Committee of Ch’ongryŏn. *Ch’ongryŏn: General Association of Residents of Koreans in Japan*. Tokyo: Chosŏn Sinbosa, 2005, 64–75.

\(^5\) In 2010, the fieldwork as well as a workshop with company members included visits to the Korean high school of Tokyo run by Ch’ongryŏn. Observations of student extra-curricular pursuits particularly of the dance and music club allowed insights into the pre-training and education of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan. In 2012, a stay in the company residence with about twenty-five of the artists allowed for observation of daily trainings, rehearsal processes and meetings as well as performances in the theatre and touring. Whenever possible activities were filmed. Extensive interviews were conducted with various company members.
2 Ha Yŏng-Su, Percussionist of the Company

Ha Yŏng-Su was born in 1970. Playing Korean drums in the orchestra of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan has been a unique experience, being exposed to the music of the two Koreas. From elementary school until high school, he went to one of the Korean schools in Japan run by Ch’ongryŏn, the association of Koreans in Japan claiming their political orientation and support of the North Korean regime. These Korean schools in Japan follow a structured curriculum where Ha Yŏng-Su learned Korean instruments from grade four. It was at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s when these Korean schools in Japan received Korean instruments sent from North Korea. Very few had access to these rare instruments. He pursued about ten years of institutionalized apprenticeship. Graduating from high school, his ability as a musician gave him the opportunity to meet people outside the North Korean community in Japan such as South Korean musicians.

Let us look at the events in the 1980s in South Korea briefly. Armstrong puts it as the word minjung (popular masses) became the general term for the broad anti-government coalition of workers, farmers, students, dissident politicians and religious activists. This ‘Minjung Movement’ dominated intellectual discourse in the late 1970s and 1980s.6

The South Koreans participating in the “minjung movement” for example, Hwang Sŏk-Yŏng, An Ch’i-Hwan, No Tong-Ŭn, Im Chin-T’aek, visited Japan to give speeches and concerts and tour several cities. For these events in Japan, the organizers invited Ha Yŏng-Su to play music. Therefore, Ha Yŏng-Su mingled with South Korean artists and intellectuals and also encountered South Korean music.

At the same time, it was a period of experimentation in South Korea with a radical evolution of the Korean percussion called Nongak7. A new genre called Samullori developed.8 In 1978, a group of four musicians including Yi Kwang-Su and Kim Tŏk-Su reinterpreted and reformulated the various existing regional nongak rhythms in order to “perform for the stage”.9 The nongak was essentially played outdoors as a participatory music, a communal sense without division be-

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7 Nongak means the music/percussion practiced by peasants and another name is p’ungmul: this music implies always the percussion combined with dancing and today it is also played by the artists who learn to present it on the stage. The common feature shared among all styles of regional nongak is “a full-scale performance including not only a variety of music, but also other entertainment such as dance, acrobatics and singing.” See Song, Bang-Song. Korean Music and Instruments. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service Ministry of Culture and Information, 1973, 15.

8 The word samul signifies “four instruments”: two made of iron (gongs called soo and ching) and two constructed of animal hides (drums called changgu and puk); the term samullori signifies thus “four instruments musical playing”.

tween players and spectators. In the *samullori*, on the contrary, percussion rhythms elaborated specifically for the stage brought modifications: limited numbers of players performed indoors and the playing was condensed. *Samullori* became more of a spectacle performed by professional players bringing a new perspective to *nongak*, often considered by Koreans as boring and out-dated.

On the other hand, this development was criticized for its emphasis on entertainment and theatricality separating the music from the people’s activities turning them into passive listeners. This was a fundamental refusal of what Korean percussion *nongak* was and should be. However, after the international tour in 1982, responses to *samullori* from abroad were immediate. Following a great success in Japan, the drum player Kim Tŏk-Su gave a series of workshops in Japan for many years.

Here we return to Ha Yŏng-Su, who excitedly participated in learning the “new” Korean drumming, which was the way of playing *samullori*.

Ha Yŏng-Su saw his destiny as a musician and for four years he studied music at the University of Music and Dance of Pyŏngyang. It was a difficult process of frequent and limited visitations due to the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He learned North Korean music in Pyŏngyang and South Korean music, *samullori*, in Tokyo. In 1992, he joined Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan and was placed in the orchestra as a drum player. As member of the company, the political rigidness of the time did not allow him any contact to South Korean musicians. Since then, he is playing mostly with the company.

The primary role of an orchestra musician was to accompany dances and songs. Ha Yŏng-Su wished to play more instrumental creations. He could not find possibilities from the structured programs of the time in which the company was occupied with reproducing dances and songs created by North Korean artists. In 1997, gathering other musicians of the company, he created a little group called Hyang, literally meaning “fragrance”. The composition of instruments was at first only for Korean instruments; for example, the wind instrument *changsaenap*¹¹, the drum *changgu*¹², the string instrument *kayagŭm*¹³. Later the group mixed in “a west-

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¹¹ *Changsaenap* is modified from the wind instrument called *Saenap* (*T’aep’yŏngso*) originally made of wood with seven holes above and a hole below. After modification in North Korea, it produces a plaintive but elegant sound for the harmonies in the orchestra. According to Song Bang-Song, the original instrument was probably introduced into Korea by the Chinese *Yuan* Dynasty around the 13th or 14th century. Since then, Korean *saenap* plays an important role in military processional music and the court music in the *Chosŏn* Dynasty. The instrument is now involved in music of sanctuaries and also peasant music, *nongak*. Song, Bang-Song, op. cit., 33. See Figure 2.

¹² This instrument consists of an hourglass shaped body with two heads made from animal hides. The left side is beaten by a fine bamboo stick whose extremity is covered with the round wooden ball and the right side is hit either with a bare hand or using an uncovered flat bamboo stick. Comité pour les arts extra-européens et l’institut national coréen de musique traditionnelle (1985): *Musique et danse de Corée (Music and Dance of Korea)*, Ateliers d’ethnomusicologie – Genève, 3. See Figure 1.

¹³ *Kayagŭm* is originally the 12-string instrument and its modified form in North Korea: Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan uses a modified *kayagŭm* of 21 strings which evolved during 1955 till the early 1970s from a
ern instrument” – the piano. The combination of instruments was rather flexible and open, dependent on the music the musicians wanted to play.

After company rehearsal, the four musicians of Hyang practiced, sometimes “transposing existing music or sometimes improvising starting from a known melody.” Their collective repertoire of instrumental solos, trios and quartets increased.

Hyang began to perform in a little bar and a small theatre in Tokyo. Receiving positive response from their first performance in 1997 Ha Yong-Su recollected:

The young students of Koreans in Japan made a long line to enter. Japanese, curious to new music were also in the crowd. The theatre held 60 but there was an audience double or triple that numbers. We had to extend our performances a few more days. It was unexpected and it surprised us. Sometimes we were invited to collaborate or exchange with the Japanese musical bands.

Hyang was experimenting with performance spaces Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan could not imagine themselves of performing in. It was channeling its creative passion free from political correctness or artistic correctness.

2.1 Challenge

Let us focus now on a particular composition Ha Yong-Su created in 2000. The composition Sŏlchanggu Tŭram (Drum Sŏlchanggu) was inspired by the melodies of “Song of the Sea” (Pada-ŭi norae), recreated in “Chosŏn style” by Ri Myŏn-Sang, a distinguished North Korean composer, from the popular sailors’ shanty (Paet norae). This composition was well received in Japan. Ha Yong-Su brought this composition to a North Korean public in Pyongyang during a regular visit of the company in April.14 Before the performance, Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan must pass “the censorship” and his music caused problems. The composition Sŏlchanggu was considered to contain American jazz-styled elements, a South Korean drumming style, a chord structure too disturbing and the standing kayagŭm playing was inappropriate. Ha Yong-Su had daylong discussions, debates, persuasions and explanations about his creation. He emphasized that his composition was inspired by a

North Korean reform. The previously existing kayagŭm on the peninsula was an instrument whose twelve silk strings are stretched over movable bridges attached to a wooden crate. A player sits on the ground playing the kayagŭm situated on the thighs. The instrumental reform in North Korea gradually increased the twelve strings to finally twenty-one strings. Mun, Yang-Suk (2005): Nam bukhun kaeryang kayagŭm ŭi t’ıksŏng kwa yŏnchupŏp: 25 hyŏn Kayagŭm kwa 21 hyŏn kayagŭm ŭl chung-sim ŭro (The characteristics and the instrumentation of kayagŭm in North Korea and South Korea: study of 25-stringed and 21-stringed kayagŭm). Masters Theses. Chungang University. South Korea. See Figure 3.

14 The Arts Festival of friendship in April 4th (wŏlŭi pom ch’insŏn yesul ch’ukeche), referred to as Taeryangch’ŏl (Period of the Sun) is an annual international festival (since 2012, it became biennale due to financial problems). In multiple places in Pyongyang numerous performances, sports manifestations, exhibitions and academic conferences celebrate the anniversary of Kim Il-Sŏng’s birthday (April 15th, 1912). Since its first appearance in 1982 (70th anniversary of Kim Il-Sŏng’s birthday), the company Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan participated. See Chosŏn Chungang Nyŏng’gam (Central Yearbook of Chosŏn, government publication), Pyongyang: Chosŏn chungang tongsinsa, 1983, 418–419 and Chosŏn Chungang Nyŏng’gam (Central Yearbook of Chosŏn, government publication), 1985, 297.
Ae-Ran Jeong

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well-known North Korean song. He understood, though, that the inspector was just doing his job and that his reservations were not a personal, subjective response to his art but simply part of his given role:

It is not about winning them over but to make them comprehend. I could feel the very intense invisible tension between personal and social and between comprehension and incomprehension. If certain musical parts are subject to being cut off or changed, then I’m ok, I have all other parts. But the North Korean musicians, who came to collaborate with us only playing those few lines, couldn’t hide tears. Very heart-breaking experience…

In the end, after negotiations resulting in modifications of certain melodies and harmonies and the composition titled “Fortune of the Nation” (Minjogŭi cheil haengun), the musical performance took place.

Ha Yŏng-Su, as a drummer, practices channeling and attuning the tension, sometimes assimilating, sometimes transgressing the boundaries. The creation, as Ha Yŏng-Su says, is not “to change other people or to demonstrate against the ideological force but as an artist, to feel for myself happiness, to feel my liveliness, to negotiate and make decisions among possible artistic choices not only because of the authoritarian censorship but in fact, my own auto censorship.” Creation is not an expression of the tension but an action channeling the tension.

2.2 Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk, Instrumentalist of the Company

Now we examine another aspect of the obstacles encountered by the artist Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk, changsaenap player of the company. Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk, born in 1974 in Tokyo, learned changsaenap at the students’ club orchestras during his years in Korean schools in Japan, elementary to high school. He then entered Chosŏn University of Tokyo for further studies specializing on his chosen instrument. Graduating from university in 1995, he joined the Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan orchestra. In 1999, he was awarded the second prize at the “2.16 Yesulsang” (February 16th Arts Awards) in Pyongyang. The following year in 2000 at Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan’s first historic performance in Seoul, Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk played a changsaenap

The instrument changsaenap was modified in North Korea, doubled its size, added more tones and produced a softer sound adopted for indoor performances (Pak, Hyŏng-Sŏp: “Minjok akki kaeryang saop ǔl ileh’ang kaesŏn hacha (to develop more work on the modification of the instrument).” Chosŏn yesul (May 1968), 81–82 and Chŏng, Yong-Ho: “Minchok akki kaeryang kwa kwanhyŏnak pyŏnsong (La modification des instruments et l’organisation de l’orchestre).” Chosŏn yesul (August 1968), 90–91.

During my fieldwork in 2012, I met him for an interview at Shinjuku Culture Centre in Tokyo, Japan, on June 27 before the annual performance of the company, Ch’umhyang-ch’ŏn (Story of Ch’umhyang).

The “2.16 Yesulsang” is one of the most prestigious annual artistic competitions in North Korea. It is a part of the “Stage of February” (Iwŏrŭi mudae) and its first edition took place in 1991. See (Chosŏn Chungang Nyŏng’gam (Central Yearbook of Chosŏn, publication of Government), 1992, Pyongyang: Chosŏn chungang r’ongsinsa, 153.

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solo Yŏlp’ung (“Hot wind”). His performance was greeted enthusiastically and the company became widely known across South Korea. Ch’oe Yong-Tŏk found himself lauded as a “star” and “celebrity”.18

3 Sunshine Policy (Haetpyŏt chŏngch’aek)

The engagement policy (1998–2008): “The original sense of payong, engagement, in Korean signifies to welcome or accept somebody or something with generosity and indulgence”.19 The title “sunshine” comes from an Aesop fable, well known in South Korea.20 This era of the Sunshine policy demonstrated two distinctive changes over previous South Korean governments towards North Korea. National unification could be established in the long term if firstly positive inter-Korean relations were sought and secondly with a movement towards a flexible, reciprocal economic cooperation.21 These common positions were initiated by the Joint Declaration June 2000. This Declaration was an agreement to work for national unification, for a balanced economic development on the peninsula and for humanitarian exchanges.22 The leadership role of the South Korean President Kim Tae-Chung advocating a peaceful relationship between the two Koreas earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. Meantime Kim Chŏng-Il garnished a deep respect and support from the people of North Korea as the “Father of Reunification”.23 The decade of the “Sunshine policy” opened up new possibilities, halting military confrontations between the rival states and encouraged exchanges not only between the two Koreas but also sought a new international status for the Koreas. During this period, numerous inter-Korean cooperation projects flourished.24 This defrosting of the relations opened doors for the company Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan leading to their first performance in South Korea at the Arts Centre of the “Little

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20 The story describes a bet between the sun and the wind. The strength of the sun removes the coat of a passing man on the road far easier than a blustering, stormy wind. The moral is warmth and openness triumphs over hostility.
Angels” in Seoul in 2000. Numerous invitations and performances continued throughout South Korea until 2008 when the inter-Korean project was discontinued by the new South Korean government of Yi Myŏng-Pak (2008–2013).

3.1 “Stardom”

The fame of Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk grew. South Korean students and musicians wanted to learn the ebangsaenap. He began to give regular workshop sessions every summer in South Korea since 2002. It should be noted that North Korea had admitted to the kidnapping of 13 Japanese in 2002 and since then, performance invitations for the company in Japan were reduced. Financial difficulties for the artists followed and most of them were forced to seek part-time jobs. Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk was the exception. Enjoying his “stardom” he was invited to numerous workshops in Seoul with good remuneration. Also, as workshop participants required instruments to learn them, Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk bought them for a low price during his Pyongyang visits and resold them for a higher price in his workshops in Seoul afterwards. Ironically, the music he learned for free from his Pyongyang masters as a “gift and love of his socialist homeland”27, brought him commercial success. According to Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk he had never imagined this fame:

*Changsaenap as a reformed and modified instrument can play both alongside the Korean instruments and the Western instruments because it is the strength and advantage complemented from the original instrument saenap. Yet precisely because of that reason, the changsaenap is in between Korean and Western music: belonging to both means, in the end, not to belong anywhere. For that reason, there are limited performance demands with this instrument.*

When Japanese musicians wanted to collaborate with Korean musicians, the changsaenap was not “ethnic” enough. They preferred calling an original saenap player directly from South Korea. In North Korea, for him as a Korean in Japan, there were very limited performance opportunities. Also, performances are subsidized by the government and not paid by the spectators, which makes it impossible for Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk to receive remuneration for his performances. Once he arrived in South Korea, he realized that South Korean audiences as well as musicians showed great interest in his music and had a desire to collaborate and learn from him. He was excited and saw new possibilities. Workshop students increased and opportu-

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25 The company was invited by The Korean Cultural Foundation, founded by MUN, Sŏn-Myŏng, Head of the religion T’ongilkyo (Unification Church). http://www.littleangels.or.kr/index.asp (visited 15 April 2013).

26 Sŏ, Yu-Sang: “Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan chosŏn muyong 50 nyŏn, puknyŏk ŭi myŏngmu” (Chosŏn dance 50 years, dances from the North), in *Minjok* 21 No. 83 (February 2008), 130–133.

27 The expression used by many artists who explained that they never paid for their apprenticeships in Pyongyang.
nities for collaborations and concerts were numerous. He thought reunification was near and he was establishing his place in a soon to be united Korea.

3.2 New Limits and Obstacles

The period of prosperity began to create difficulties. The frictions of the Sunshine policy escalated towards the end of President Ro Mu-Hyŏn's term, and soon became untenable. In 2008, Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk’s usual temporary visa application for summer workshops was refused. He was asked to obtain a South Korean passport. For days, he reflected on the request and on the consequences of his status in Japan. In the end, Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk decided, to secure his musical survival (salki-wibae), to apply for South Korean nationality.

Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk continued the summer workshops in Seoul, though he still needed a temporary visa as a Korean in Japan despite his South Korean passport. In 2011, the North Korean president Kim Chŏng-Il passed away and Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan visited his funeral. Returning to Tokyo, he received a call from an officer of the South Korean ambassador in Tokyo. He was accused of visiting North Korea without permission. Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk apologized and excused himself asking for a humanitarian reprieve for attending a funeral. The officer simply rescinded his South Korean temporary visa which would no longer be renewed. The Sunshine policy, in practice, came to an end in 2008. By that time, the number of private students and workshops had gradually decreased. In 2012, with very few students left, Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk decided it was not worth the struggle to get a visa. Since then, he has not entered South Korea again.

The young musicians of Koreans in Japan listening to what I did, changing my nationality and going for the workshops in South Korea, they could see a new way of working and another possibility. I say to those young musicians not to change their nationality too quickly, it’s not only about the passport. South Korea and North Korea were to open themselves to the world, how great it would be. I can perform freely, ah, the word “freely” – how difficult is it, who knew, in our time, today!

Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk experienced the “freedom” to perform in two Koreas and Japan during the decade of the Sunshine policy. His performances and workshops for South Koreans allowed him to get into contact with them and create a harmonious interface. He always tried to open and redefine the borders with his music, “de-bordering” the Koreas. This has demonstrated the flexibility of borders and at the same time reminded us of how difficult borders are to break and how resilient they are to return to their status quo. The possibilities of an “art-as-interface” opened by the Sunshine policy, that Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk experienced so shortly, seemed like a dream, a mirage, territorial mirage by a phenomenon of political refraction.
4 Conclusion

The study of the music of Ha Yŏng-Su, percussionist, and Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk, changsaenap player, both respected and long-standing members of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan, demonstrated different negotiations and strategies. The percussionist Ha Yŏng-Su was able to present his composition in Pyongyang only after modifications of his musical style that would have been, otherwise, perceived as too close to the South Korean taste. Ch’oe Yŏng-Tŏk was able to present his music in Seoul only after converting to South Korean nationality resulting in a prohibition of playing in North Korea. As a Korean artist in Japan, having a split homeland and working precisely in the realm of “art-as-interface”, the two players were each “instrumentalized” as much by South Korea as by North Korea in a similar manner. The two Koreas are mirroring each other, both sides are equally constitutive. But these Korean artists in Japan are willing to take up their position in the interface recognizing the absence and presence of and in the other Korea. They constantly negotiate to define and re-define their selves as creative artists at the interface between two Koreas.

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**Governmental Sources**


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Figure 1: *Changgu (small waist drum)*

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28 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Janggu.jpg.
Figure 2: Taep'yŏngso (original form)\textsuperscript{29}

Figure 2: 12 String Kayagŭm\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29} Source: https://ko.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%ED%8C%8C%EC%9D%BC.%ED%83%9C%ED%8F%89%EC%86%8C_(1).JPG

\textsuperscript{30} Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kayagumplayer2.jpg.
The Current Situation of the Language, Newspapers and Publications of Koreans in the Primorye Region in Russia

Alexander Kim

1 Introduction

Koreans had lived in the southern region of what is now Russia’s Far East before the arrival of Russian explorers in this area. Thus, they constitute a core population of the contemporary Primor’e Region of the Russian Federation. In the nineteenth century, however, the Koreans in the southern part of the Russian Far East were comparatively few. Beginning in the late nineteenth century because of the difficult economic circumstances on the Korean peninsula and the expansion of Japan many inhabitants from Korea began to move to the Russian Far East.

Koreans in the southern part of the Russian Far East originally spoke the Hamgyŏng-dialect (Lankov, 2002) but during the 20th Century this dialect changed in many aspects.
2 The Newspapers

The first newspaper published by Koreans in the Russian Far East was called “Kwongop” which was established by Jang Do Bin (Jang Dobin) in 1912. Jang Do Bin emigrated from the Korean peninsula in 1911. His newspaper, which was not published regularly, dealt with the problems of Koreans in the Russian territories and the movements against Japanese occupation of Korea.

After the end of the Russian Civil War (1922) and until 1937, as the date of the first ethnic deportation within the Soviet Union, Koreans established several newspapers like “Vanguard” (in Russian – Avangard). Part of it was written in Korean Hamgyŏng dialect which was used among Chinese Koreans and Soviet Koreans who lived in the southern part of the Soviet Far East during the first part of the 20th Century. The newspaper was important for different groups of the old generation of the Korean Diaspora in the Soviet Union because part of them arrived in Russia, coming from China, since the 1920s and did not attend schools in the Russian Far East and thus did not understand the Russian language properly.

Obviously, these newspapers were under the direct control of Soviet Koreans who were members of the Communist party, like Han Menshe (his Russian name was Han Andrei) and Kim Afanasij.

These newspapers did not provide “real information” and spread only political propaganda among Soviet Koreans. Editors and authors were writing in opposition to the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula, though this subject could not be considered part of the official policy of the Soviet Union in the Far East. In some issues, editors gave information about and in the Russian language.

In many villages Korean language schools were established, in modern Usuriysk-city a college for education in Korean existed (Kim, 1992). In the context of the deportation of ethnic Koreans from 1937 all Korean newspapers were liquidated, part of them were reestablished during different periods in Middle Asia. Schools with Korean language and other educational institutions in the Soviet Far East were closed.

After Stalin’s death (1953), Soviet Koreans started to come back into the southern part of the Russian Far East. However, the Soviet Union continued a national discriminatory policy against different ethnic groups in the Far East and Koreans in the Primorye region were part of this. This policy was contradicted by the so-called official “internationalism” of the USSR but the Soviet government did not pay attention to this. Clearly, under national and political pressure the Soviet Koreans could not establish newspapers. Moreover, in the situation of ethnic discrimination against Soviet Koreans who lived in the Primorye region they could not study and learn the Korean language because it was considered an unnatural activity and the effects from this can be tragic.

The situation changed only towards the end of the Soviet era. Political and economical problems in some Middle Asian Soviet republics resulted in the discrimination of the non-indigenous population. As a result of this, Middle Asian
Koreans started to move back into the southern part of the Soviet Far East and the number of members of the Soviet Korean Diaspora in the Far Eastern region increased. Moreover, ideological and ethnic pressures from Soviet control organizations in the Primorye region decreased. As a result, some Soviet Koreans, who knew Hamgyŏng dialect, as well as Koreans from North and South Korea started to teach the Korean language. Almost all of them gave private lessons in return for money.

In 1990, Mr. Kim Telmir, who was the son of Kim Afanasij mentioned earlier, established “Vozrozhdenie” (Rebirth), the Social Philanthropic Foundation of Koreans in the Primorye Region in Ussuriysk and became the first president of this organization. After that he established the first Korean newspaper in the southern part of the Russian Far East after the Korean Deportation. This newspaper was named “Wŏndong” (Far East) and was based in the “Vozrozhdenie” Foundation. The title of this newspaper was written in Hamgyŏng dialect, however, almost all of the young Korean population cannot speak Korean as a result of the policy of discrimination by the Soviet State. All people from the old generation can speak Korean but cannot read and write because there were hardly any Korean schools after 1937. Therefore, “Wŏndong” was written only in Russian. The editor of “Wŏndong” was Kim Telmir.¹

At first this newspaper was very popular among Koreans, not only among Primorye Koreans, but in other regions of the Korean Diaspora too. Mr. Jang, who is a son of Jang Do Bin and occupies a high-level position in the corporation “Kohap group”, gave financial support to Kim Telmir not only for his foundation but for the newspaper, too.

However, the organization of this newspaper was not good and some material by certain authors cannot be considered as relevant and interesting. Moreover, the aim of “Wŏndong” changed very often. The newspaper tried to give information about the life of the Korean Diaspora in the Primorye region and in the Republic of Korea.

From the end of the 1990s this newspaper could not be published regularly. Firstly, there was a problem of organization and then editors and authors were not able to provide material for the newspaper.

In 2000, as a result of elections, Kim Telmir lost his position as president of the Foundation but remained an editor of “Wŏndong”.

A group of young people took the initiative and established a new newspaper named “Generation” (in Russian – Pokolenie). The newspaper was based within the “Vozrozhdenie” Foundation. This newspaper was written only in Russian but tried to give lessons in the Korean language, information about Korean traditions and other topics. However, “Generation” existed only because of the enthusiasm of several individuals. As a result of this, the newspaper was not published regularly and could not rise to high popularity. Moreover, “Generation” aimed at the young

generation of Russian Koreans but at that time many young people from the Korean Diaspora did not have any interest in Korean culture and language. Therefore, the newspaper could not find a large number of readers. Finally, “Generation” stopped its publication in 2000.\(^2\)

However, in 2004, again based within the “Vozrozhdenie” Foundation, another newspaper started publishing – “Koryŏ sinmun”. This newspaper received financial and technical support from the Korean national autonomy authorities in Ussuriysk and the Overseas Korea Foundation. “Koryŏ Sinmun” has Russian and Korean articles but the Korean part is not published regularly. 90% of the earliest issues of the newspaper consisted of compilations of internet material but later the situation changed. Ida Kim, a professional journalist, gradually reformed the style of the newspaper. She published a large number of original materials, about not only domestic events but stories on Korean life too. Ida Kim submitted some columns on stories, upcoming events, translated pieces by Korean writers and others into Russian. As a result, the newspaper was popular not only within the community of the Korean Diaspora but among Russian people too.

However, later Ida Kim’s “Koryŏ Sinmun” could not provide much interesting and informative material and lost some readers.

In the second half of the 2000s, the new Head of the “Vozrozhdenie” Foundation withdrew from cultural and educational activities and concentrated on business activities. Therefore, “Koryŏ Sinmun” moved to the Center of culture of Primorye Koreans, which was established by the Korean national autonomy authorities in Ussuriysk and the Overseas Korea Foundation.\(^3\)

### 3 Language

From the 1990s, the number of Koreans in the Korean Diaspora in the Primorye region increased. Thus, more opportunities of teaching and studying the Korean language were offered. In the 1990s, some private instructors taught the Hamgyŏng dialect or the North and South Korean languages but in the 2000s, only the South Korean language remained in the educational sphere for different reasons.

In the first place, the study of the Korean language is useful especially economically in the Russian Far East – many Primorye Koreans are working in the Republic of Korea. Therefore, they only need the South Korean language. The Hamgyŏng dialect can be used only in the Korean national autonomous district in China (Yanbian district) but in this area, we can use the South Korean language very easily – many Chinese Koreans can understand it.

In the second place, if we want to compare a number of specialists in the Korean language in the southern part of the Russian Far East we can see that the

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\(^2\) Information from separated issues of this newspaper from 2002, 2005.

\(^3\) Information from separate issues of this newspaper from 2007–2010, 2014.
South Korean language is in a dominant position. In the private language courses in Korean church schools, we can see only the language of South Korea. Moreover, we will find the same situation in the Department of East Asian linguistics of the Far Eastern Federal University. Some private schools in Ussuriysk and Vladivostok provide language courses in South Korean language. One state school in Ussuriysk — No 3 — became a school with a Korean national component.

Thirdly, the Hamgyŏng-dialect is more complicated than the South Korean language for Russian-speaking people. For example, this dialect has the morpheme “dze”, which is not used in South and North Korean standard language. The Hamgyŏng-dialect has three main forms of regards (politeness) — jondaemal, chungmal (sometimes considered as the unclear/neutral form) and pangmal. The South Korean language has two main forms of politeness, moreover the language adopted some words from English (so called Konglish), which Russian speaking people can remember very easily.

In spite of this, more than 90% of Koreans in the Primorye region cannot speak any form of Korean. The first reason for this is that the study of the Korean language does not have federal or provincial support, which differentiates it from the situation in China. The second reason is a lack of motivation. Young Koreans do not need the Korean language in every-day life — they need only the Russian language. The third reason is traditional. Primorye Koreans lived under national discrimination for nearly 50 years in the Soviet Union. As a result, they do not have the tradition to study the Korean language properly.

4 Concluding remarks

So, as we can see, the Korean language in the Primorye region of the Russian Federation changed fundamentally. All Koreans in the southern part of the Soviet (and later Russian) Far East spoke in Hamgyŏng-dialect during the first half of the 20th Century but to the end of the same century this language remained in use only among the older generations, excluding some young enthusiasts who wanted to study only for private interests. The young generation has an interest in studying the South Korean dialect for different reasons but the number of people who can use this language is low — only a few percent.

Newspapers by Primorye Koreans greatly changed too. If in the first half of the 20th century these newspapers were involved in some political polemics and were written in Korean, later, the situation changed. Recently, Korean newspapers prefer to use the Russian language and avoid political aspects.
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Koreans in Ussuriysk.
Deportation and Repression of the Soviet Koreans during the 1930s: Reasons and Results

Alexander Kim

1 Introduction

As is well known, the ethnic repressions in the Soviet Far East during the 1930s had some specifics, which were different from the same political processes in the central or western parts of the USSR. Repressions against national minorities and a policy of deportations started from this region in the Soviet Union. In spite of the start of the repressive processes in the Far East, the main repressions took part later than in the central or western parts of the USSR. The mechanism of political pressure very quickly developed and played a big role in the state. And these processes were the basis for repressions and deportations during the 1940s and 1950s and became practical reality for political pressures during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, repressions in the Soviet Union were a base for similar political processes in other states of the socialist system after the Second World War.

The historiographical work on a source base consists of materials from different Soviet archives, partly found in Korea, and works by Russian and foreign scholars. A very important book is the monograph by S. Suturin (2009). This work contains materials from the state archive of the Khabarovsk region, which was opened in the 1980s. However, a part of the more recent materials could not be accessed.
2 Historical Context

Stalin’s repressions in the Soviet Union are a topic of discussion not merely in Russia but also abroad. Scholars published a number of works on this subject. It is evident that their assessment changes with the changing political context but no one denies that they took place. The ethnic repressions are among the most hotly debated topics in post-Soviet historiography. On the one hand, their occurrence contradicted the principles of internationalism and the equal rights of peoples, which had been proclaimed by the Soviet government already during the Civil War. However, under Stalin these principles were changed. On the other hand, the echoes of those repressions are still heard today, as in the Chechen Wars, ethnic conflicts in big cities of Russia and so forth. Both of these features clearly present themselves in the case of the first ethnic total deportation – of the Soviet Koreans.

We must note that among the most tragic episodes during the Stalin period was the persecution of individuals because of their ethnic traits, which, in essence, flew in the face of Soviet support for the equality of peoples. Many nationalities of the USSR received pressure because of their ethnicity. The scars of that drama survive until this day and continue to have an impact on both politics and the way in which the national question plays out in general in contemporary Russia.

The first victims of these ethnic repressions were Soviet Koreans, a national minority living in the Far East that was not hostile to Soviet power and to a high degree loyal to the Soviet leaders’ policies (Martin 1998, 813–861; Gelb 1995, 389–412). In Russian, relatively many works have been published about the deportation of Soviet Koreans, but their attention has mainly been on separate incidents and specific aspects of the fate of the deported (Bugai 1995). In addition, little has been said about the long-term effect of these repressions on the Korean ethnos or the precise nature of the attitude of the ethnic Russians or other Slavs toward the Soviet Koreans within the Russian or Soviet society.

Much has been written about the causes of the forced deportations. In summarizing the opinion of historians in general terms, the following picture emerges. The majority of Soviet and Russian scholars, as well as investigators elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (the organization of post-Soviet states), propose that the deportation of the Soviet Koreans was a preventative measure. Opinions by historians, however, differ on why this was done. Some scholars argue that the fact that the Soviet Koreans lived in close proximity to the Korean state causing some trepidation among the authorities. Others think that the basis for the deportation may have been the demand for national autonomy. A third group maintains that the Koreans were to fill a labor-resource vacuum in Central Asia. Still others suggest that a foreign-policy calculation caused the deportation of the Koreans.
2.1 Reasons for Deportation

Apparently, there were three grounds for deportation. The first was political, like the attempt to isolate Soviet Koreans from their motherland, the Korean peninsula, in order to separate them from their historical ethnic roots and to assimilate them into the Soviet state. Many Koreans fled to the Far East because of the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula (in the early twentieth century).

A number of these refugees joined the partisan units that operated against the Japanese not only in Korea but also in Manchuria. This caused a tense situation on the border. Japan considered their activity very seriously and sometimes asked the Soviet government about it. Moreover, these incidents can be considered as “casus belli”. Soviet Russia neither wanted to be nor could be at war with Japan. The memory of the tsarist Russian defeat in the war of 1904 – 1905 was still fresh in Soviet Russia. This was already expressed by V. I. Lenin (1870 – 1924) who wrote that “[w]e cannot wage war with Japan and we need to do everything not only to try to postpone a war with Japan, and, if possible, avoid one altogether, as this is obviously beyond our power at the moment” (Lenin, 1970: 93). Many Bolsheviks agreed with him.

The second reason for the deportations was economic. Soviet leaders wanted to deport Koreans from the southern part of the Soviet Far East. Even today, the Khabarovsk region trails the neighboring Primorye region in terms of agricultural development. For example, I visited Khabarovsk in 2012 and had the opportunity to compare the price of potatoes, the most popular root vegetable in Russia. In Khabarovsk, Russian potatoes had cost 60 rubles per kilogram on the market, whereas Chinese potatoes cost only 30 rubles. In the Primorye region cost of local potatoes was 15 rubles per kilogram but the local population complained about this price. Inhabitants of Primorye region did not eat potatoes from China. The causes of this situation are the natural conditions of the Khabarovsk region, where conditions are less favorable to agriculture, and the more advanced technology used in the Primorye region in agriculture in comparison to its northern neighbor.

Around 1900, the Koreans used on their plots the Korean-Chinese manner of horticulture by growing crops in beds, in which a rotation of different crops was used. The beds stuck out of the ground and the crops were sown within them. When Russian peasants at the beginning of the twentieth century arrived here they were confronted with soil that sharply differed from that in central and western parts of the Russia and did not allow them to use the methods to which they were accustomed successfully. Several among them tried to borrow the methods of

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1 This idea was first expressed by the famous geographer N.M. Przheval’skii (1839–1888) in the 1860s, but he proposed to resettle the Koreans in the central and northern parts of the Maritime region because they could engage in truck gardening and would more easily adjust to Russian culture, while being further removed from the Korean peninsula. He did not suggest the resettlement toward Khabarovsk, probably because it did not appear economically viable.

2 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GARF] fond 1318, 1922–1923, delo 670, list 64, f. 1318, 1922–1923, d. 670, l. 64.
cultivation used by the Koreans, but, in lack of any traditions to this regard and to the lack of support from the government they were mostly unsuccessful. Even today, the Russian population has not succeeded in fully taking over the Korean-Chinese methods.

The plan to resettle the Korean population could not be executed until 1937 for a number of reasons. In the first place, it contradicted Bolshevik policies, such as the principle of “internationalism” (i.e. the right of nations to self-determination), and the resettlement of the Koreans to regions where the conditions for agriculture were difficult could hardly be called a decoration for their support in the Civil War. Secondly, the Soviet Koreans resided in the extreme south of the Far East and they did not want to move to the north. A unwilling Korean population in the area might jeopardize Soviet rule there. And, finally, a mass transfer of the Koreans would create great problems in the Primorye region, not in the least in economic terms.

The third reason was connected to a general resistance. From 1931 an intense struggle between the population and the state in the Far East began. Collectivization and “dekulakization” had a profound effect on life in the Soviet countryside. The Korean population did not escape from being subjected to these policies. The persecution of the peasantry by the authorities caused a difficult situation in the countryside and led to protest and rebellion. However, in contrast to the Russian population, which mainly protested verbally against the authorities, with some engaging in open insubordination and a few taking to arms, the Koreans went a different route: they left for abroad which had significant economic repercussions on the area.

State coercion, mass searches and arrests, in other words the tyranny of the authorities, caused Soviet Koreans to leave in huge numbers for China. Thus 60% of the Korean population of the Shkotovskii and Suchanskii districts left for China, as did 50% of the Grodekovskii district, 45% of the Chernigovskii district, and so on. Of course, only those Korean families that had a residence permit and were Soviet citizens were counted. There were, however, also Koreans who lived in the USSR who were not registered and fell outside of the authorities’ field of vision because of this. Their number is difficult to estimate but they might have amounted to no less than half (and perhaps even more) of all Koreans in the Soviet territory. Those unregistered Koreans also engaged in agriculture and played a role in providing the region with food. It is known that a few hundred Soviet Koreans were arrested by

3 “Dekulakization” meant the removal of the alleged richer peasants (“kulaks”) from the villages, as supposed capitalist exploiters of their neighbors; “kulak” families were deported to remote areas, while their property was confiscated by the newly created collective farms; several 100,000 kulak families were thus deported to “special settlements” around 1930 [trans.]. See for more Viola, 2009.

4 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Khabarovskogo Kraia (State Archive of Khabarovsk Region, Khabarovsk) [GAKhK] P2/2–4/169, ll.78–9.
military troops of the NKVD\(^5\) near the border with China and deported to Soviet villages. However, almost all Soviet Koreans, who wanted to immigrate to China, moved and stayed in Manchuria.

This massive exodus led to great problems in the agriculture and habitation of these districts. The following numbers only concern the proportion of the Korean emigrants that had been officially registered: In 1937, some years after the massive exodus of the Korean population to China, Koreans constituted 20\% of the population in the Grodekovskii and Shkotovskii\(^6\) districts. Between 1930 and 1934, as we saw earlier, 50\% of the Koreans of Grodekovskii district left. Based on those numbers, it transpires that the Korean population in these districts formed 40 to 50\% of the total population around 1930. Thus, one could conclude that a number of administrative units of Primorye region lost between a fourth to a third of the population due to emigration.

The NKVD began to deport the Koreans in massive fashion in September 1937. But when it did so, the deportees were not supplied in their places of exile with cattle or goods to replace those that the exiled had been forced to leave behind in the Far East. This went against the guidelines of the Soviet leadership, which called for compensation to the deported population for the cattle and property that they had to leave behind.

A comprehensive calculation shows that 171,781 people, who formed 36,442 families, were deported from the Far Eastern Region. Other counts suggest about 175,000 Koreans were brought to Central Asia.\(^7\)

However, according to statistical information from 1935 nearly 204,000 Koreans lived in the Soviet Far East.\(^8\) Therefore, we can conclude that deportation cannot cover all Soviet Koreans that lived in the Soviet Far East. Moreover, some Chinese Koreans who were deported we shall consider later.

NKVD executed the deportations of the Soviet Koreans not only with excessive haste and with great errors but also in violation of the government’s guidelines.\(^9\) Ezhov\(^10\), however, reported to Stalin that the operation was successfully conducted. But was this the case?

Why were the deportations conducted in such a manner? A number of factors influenced this. Firstly, this was the first deportation conducted on ethnic grounds; during its unfolding, of course, many mistakes and tragic errors occurred just because of this fact alone. Secondly, the ethnic repressions were undermined by acts of sabotage from the local population and government, for which thousands were

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\(^5\) NKVD: Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del, People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, under whose authority fell the Soviet security organs in the second half of the 1930s.

\(^6\) GARF, 1235/130 (1935)/3, ll. 20–21.

\(^7\) GARF, f. 1235, op. 130 (1935), d.3, ll. 20–1; Bugai, 1994, 141–148.

\(^8\) GARF 1235/130 (1935)/3, ll. 20–1.

\(^9\) GARF 5446/57/52, l.29; 5446sch/29/48, ll. 63–4; 5446sch/29/51, l.16.

\(^10\) He was Head of NKVD at that time.
subsequently prosecuted. Thirdly, there was the massive flight of Koreans to China before the repressions.

2.2 Results of Deportation

From February to May 2012, I traveled around the Primorye Region surveying the descendants of the repressed Koreans and received some interesting answers. Out of 93 respondents twenty noticed that their parents spoke very poor Russian even in the 1990s. It should be noted that after the deportations Korean schools did not exist for a long time in Central Asia and children attended Russian schools. Therefore, in settlements of Korean deportees the Russian language should have dominated.

But at the same time, it was common knowledge in the USSR that Koreans spoke Russian poorly. Even anecdotes existed about this topic. More than half of the forebears of those surveyed (60 people) had Korean names but spoke in a dialect that strongly differed from the language that was used by the Soviet Koreans of the Far East. This leads one to propose that many Koreans who had been deported during the 1930s differed from other Koreans who had long resided in the Far East (and who were also deported). That's why I suggest that a number of the repressed Koreans who spoke Russian poorly did not study the Russian language in the Soviet schools of the Far East. More likely they hailed from Northeastern China, i.e. Manchuria.

Every year I travel to the Yanbian Korean autonomous region in Jilin province in the Chinese People’s Republic. The Koreans of this region speak in two dialects, both similar to the language of the Korean population of the Russian Far East. For this reason, I suggest that NKVD units not only arrested Soviet Koreans who were citizens of the USSR but also Koreans from China, who had crossed the border to engage in seasonal work on Soviet territory. This happened because the ethnic repression began in September, at the peak of the agricultural activity, and this is particularly so in the agrarian areas of the Primorye region located along the border. The deportations of Koreans from other areas were conducted later and Koreans from Vladivostok were the last ones. Naturally, such a sequence of events prevented the Chinese Koreans from returning home. Of course, a question arises from this: Why exactly did Koreans from China work in great numbers in the southern part of the Soviet Far East?

This had to do with the departure to China of many Soviet Koreans at the beginning of the 1930s to escape collectivization. A deficit of vegetables developed in the Primorye Region, since many Koreans were horticulturists. Because the Russian population could not provide itself with vegetables, the problem had to be resolved through the use of guest workers (“Gastarbeiter”). During this period the Chinese of this part of the world engaged but little in agriculture and largely lived in towns (like, Vladivostok), and that is why the problem was resolved through the labor of Chinese Koreans. Seasonal labor rather suited the latter, especially when
from 1933 onwards the Japanese conducted military campaigns in North-Eastern China.

But apart from that, China was then in a precarious situation. Factions of Chinese militarists literally tore China apart and it was quite difficult for the population to engage in peaceful labor during that period. Despite Japanese declarations about the defense of the Koreans in Manchuria and their encouragement of Korean immigration to North-Eastern China, the economic circumstances of the Koreans in this region were deplorable.\(^{11}\) This explains their attempts to live in the USSR at a time when in the Soviet Far East the situation was completely different: The area was tranquil, not much crime occurred and at the same time, agriculture needed their labor.

Chinese Koreans therefore grew accustomed to starting their work there in spring and return quietly home in autumn. Many of them lived in the Soviet Far East with their families since it proved more convenient. They were not, however, citizens of the USSR. The autumn of 1937, however, ended tragically for them. The majority of them were dispatched to Central Asia as part of the Soviet-Korean deportations.

In essence, the Far East, like many regions of the Soviet Union, became a victim of the short-sighted policies of the government of the Soviet state. The Korean population became for almost two decades a hostage in Central Asia of the repressive Soviet system. The agricultural problems in the Far East led to a sustained agricultural crisis which was only resolved in the course of several decades. The poor condition of agriculture in the Far East caused the hasty foundation of two post-secondary agronomy institutes in the Far Eastern region, in 1950 in Blagoveschensk and in 1957 in the city of Voroshilov\(^ {12}\) (modern Ussuriysk). In addition, the latter one was established in a period of great difficulty that tore apart the lives of thousands of people.\(^ {13}\)

However, we must note that the Korean population in the southern part of the Soviet Far East demonstrated an interesting form of passive resistance against the repressive policy by the USSR. Migration to China, refusal to take part in dekulakization for Korean peasants, support of Russian Old believers for the emigration to China stopped the process of the collectivization in the Far East. As a result, the Soviet government started the process of the first ethnic deportation within the USSR, because the activity of Soviet Koreans can give an example for the Russian rural population engaged in agriculture.

But this deportation was not complete – a large number of the Soviet Koreans emigrated to China before the start of the deportation. As a result, Soviet officers deported a part of Chinese Koreans who stayed at that time in the Soviet Far East.

\(^{11}\) “Memorandum prem’er-ministra Iaponii generala Giiti Tanaka ot 25 iuilia 1927 g.”

\(^{12}\) Makarenko, 2008, 199–221.

\(^{13}\) “Kratkaia istoricheskaia spravka no.1.”
Moreover, the Korean ethnic deportation established economic problems in the eastern part of the USSR.

The repression on ethnic grounds also played another role, however. Because of discrimination, the majority of the Soviet Koreans grew closer together, supported each other, cultivated their cultural traditions and language and stubbornly resisted assimilation. Only during the second half of the 1990s, when the Russian nationalist tensions evaporated in the Far East, did the process of assimilation of the Korean population acquire a swifter pace.

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1 Introduction

The 19th and 20th century are characterized by increased migration processes across different countries and borders. Asian countries and Asian ethnic groups are no exception to this. Traditionally, the number of countries is many times less than the number of the peoples, meaning there are more peoples than individual states. (Hakim 2005: 167). Uighurs and Koreans are among the nations who have experienced many sufferings and trials. Basically, they are the cause of inter-state political vicissitudes and intentions. As a result, these people were scattered in many countries of the world. Obviously, they can be called dispersed ethnic groups.

2 On Korean and Uyghur population

Koreans and Uighurs have in common that groups of them are living on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The reason for that were political vicissitudes involving such large countries as Japan, Russia, China, the USSR (Obuhov 2010: 331–334). Koreans and Uighurs are immigrants and descendants of immigrants. Data describing the migration processes of the nationalities show how they were held in harsh conditions, bordering on a humanitarian disaster and humiliating national dignity.
It was a question of the survival of many ethnic groups. These processes are in the past now.

Today, Koreans and Uighurs have their place among the many ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan. Thus, according to the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2015 the Uighur population is 0.91% and the Korean 0.32% of the total population of Kyrgyzstan. For comparison, you can refer to the data of the official census for various years.

1959: Koreans – 3622 persons (0.30% of the population of Kyrgyzstan); Uighurs – 13,157 persons (0.64%). 1989: Koreans – 18,355 persons (0, 43%); Uighurs – 36,779 persons (0.86%). 2009: Koreans – 17,299 persons (0.32%); Uighurs – 48,543 persons (0.91%). In recent years up to 2015 numbers have hardly changed.

If we look at the regions, you can see the different ratio for the settlement of the Korean and Uyghur population. According to data for 2009, the maximum number of residents of ethnic Koreans was accounted for Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan with 12,014 persons. This is followed by the numbers for Chui province, surrounding the capital of the country (4388 persons). 327 Koreans lived in Osh, 133 Koreans in the Issyk-Kul region, 237 people in Jalal-Abad province, 1 Korean lived in the town of Naryn.

As for the Uighurs, most of them live in Chui province (15,276 persons). In the city of Bishkek 13,350 persons were registered. The Issyk-Kul region is home to 3897 Uighurs, in the city of Osh there were 804 Uighurs, in Naryn 339, in Jalal-Abad province 5842. Many Uighurs on the results of the official census were registered among the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz according to their ethnic attribution in their passports. However, as shown by our observations and the findings of other authors, absolutely all of them identify themselves as Uighurs (Asankanov 2014: 120).

3 Ethnic Identity and Language Usage

An important criterion of the ethnic identity is the degree of the native language skill (Abdullaeva 2016: 47). If we look at the younger generation, we observe among Uighurs and Koreans similarities in the trend of active transition to a language of international communication, which in Kyrgyzstan is Russian. As a result, we can say that at the moment, unfortunately, the Uighurs learn and use the Uighur language only within the family and for some everyday communication. In other words, the scope of the use of the language compared to other languages seems limited. This is due to the lack of primary schools and care facilities and universities that offer teaching in the Uighur language, so the language use is restricted to the minimum scope of proceedings and the nature of interaction with other languages is limited (Baskakov 1982: 184). The last factor is due to the fact that the processes of interaction with other languages do not always bring a posi-
tive effect for the development of a specific language, bearing in mind processes such as assimilation, hybridization, and so on (Cheremisina 2004: 204–216). But be that as it may, we have a situation where it becomes a characteristic tendency towards the active use of other languages instead of Uighur among the younger generation or the two younger generations. The result is that, unfortunately, young Uighurs and Uighur woman among each other and with the representatives of the older generation cannot speak Uighur at home. It's a depressing and problematic situation but it is a fact.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the mother tongue today, especially in the case of restrictions of the scope of its functional use. The fate of the language is the fate of the people. Language is the common, single treasure, which is owned by each nation, each ethnic group as a whole. This heritage is transmitted from generation to generation, from age to age, giving, but not decreasing, but only slowly increasing and enriched (Cheremisina 2004: 47).

The fact that the Uighur youth is fluent in other languages is certainly a welcome factor in the context of globalization, increased intercultural contacts and the integration of economic and cultural ties. This leads to a broader view of the world, adapting to the realities, combining skills among much stir in the world. Moreover, the use of the Uighur language (though partial use, but nevertheless the use of it and not forgetting tradition) in the context of multilingualism, natural switching codes allows even to enrich the Uighur language neoplasms. But the main condition for this, again, is for the language to function.

The same pattern is seen in the young generation of the Korean community. The difference is that the Uighur youth is better in understanding and command Kyrgyz, the national language, but this can be explained by the fact that the Uighur and Kyrgyz languages are related and belong to the same group of Turkic languages.

3.1 Further Thoughts on Ethnic Identity

The language factor is an important element of the ethnic identity but not the only one as reality shows in Kyrgyzstan and not the decisive factor. For example, one of the smaller ethnic groups in this country are the Kalmyks, who are almost assimilated and integrated into the Kyrgyz ethnicity. Kalmyks, called Sart-Kalmyks, nearly completely lost their mother tongue and only use Kyrgyz language in everyday communication. Moreover, they adopted Muslim customs and traditions, completely adopting Islamic traditions. However, the Kalmyks identify themselves only as Kalmyks.

Koreans and Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan also definitely consider themselves as representatives of Korean and Uyghur ethnic communities.

In our view, the relevant factor in ethnic and cultural life of Koreans and Uighurs should recognize the presence or the absence of links with their historical homeland, as well as the presence or absence of the formation of an independent
state (Lee 1998: 78). The fact is that in this respect the Koreans celebrated a sufficiently strong basis for the preservation of their ethnic identity while among Uighurs such a framework is virtually absent.

Currently, elected representatives from among the ethnic groups are working as members of Parliament - Zhogorku Kenesh. Representatives of the Korean nationality were represented in the government cabinet as ministers: Kim Nikifor Lukic - former agriculture minister, Kim Nelly Nikolaevna - Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, etc. The names of Korean business executives and business men are Pak A.V, Magay A. Q. Choi A.V etc. (Fukalov 2004: 48).

Koreans and Uighurs are actively represented in the academic, scientific and pedagogical sphere of the country: Doctor of biological sciences Professor Li V.V., doctor of philological sciences Professor Abdullaev, S.N., doctor of philosophy Professor Narynbaev A.I, Kadyrov A. etc. The structure of the Kyrgyz National University named after J. Balasagyn has a functioning Uighur Faculty of Philology.

Ethno-cultural life of Koreans is active enough. Since 1989 there were established many cultural centers to revive the customs, traditions and language of native Koreans. Associations of Koreans’ are e.g. “Chinson” (Radium L.T), “Asok”, “Kvahak”, “Ching”, “Kore Noin”, “Mununhva”, “Koreada” and others. In 1998, most national cultural centers were merged in the “Public association of the Koreans of the Kyrgyz Republic” (Shin R.A chairmen of “Public association of the Koreans of the Kyrgyz Republic”).

Uighur ethnic cultural centers do not show the same fragmentation. All Kyrgyz Uighurs are brought together in the company “Ittipak” which is one of the largest associations in the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan. The exception is the ethnocultural center “Renaissance”, operating in the Issyk-Kul region. This relatively high unity of Uighurs is due to a lack of contacts with their historical homeland and the need to rely on their own capabilities.

Koreans and Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan successfully develop their national art and culture in today’s globalized world. For example, in the periphery of the Uighur diaspora in the Issyk-Kul region in the 90s of the last century only more than 30 songs in the Uighur language were created. Many of them have become popular, like “Atkan tea”, “Ghetip Sanam” and others. Fictional literature of Koreans and Uighurs is represented by names such as G.N Lee, Yu Lee, A. Pak, M. Noruzov, J. Kasymov, N. Kambarova, I. Ibragimov (М. Норузов “Шеирлар”, И. Ибрагимов “Чыпленок и самолет”, Н. Камбарова «Шеирлар»), and others. For friends of fine art even known outside Kyrgyzstan are names as Kogan, G. Yugay, Yugay M., V. Kim, S. Babadjanov, T. Mirrahimov, S. Tairov, F Ruziev. Musical art is an essential characteristic of Koreans and Uighurs, an integral part of their cultural code (Abdullaeva 2020). As individuals who have contributed to the development of song and music in Kyrgyzstan we could name T. Ligai, J.H Kim, A. Choi, M. Khasanov, A. Hasanova, F. Ashirova, S. Abdullaev, T. Nurahunov, S. Karimov, E. Sadykov and others.
4 Conclusion

Thus, we can observe that today work on the preservation of ethnic identity of the Uighur and Korean peoples is functioning in Kyrgyzstan. Solution of this noble task cannot be compared with the one-time inefficient solution based on daily events (Sydykov 2001: 79). The key to success in solving the problem that confronts the current situation of Koreans and Uighurs is to finish the consolidation of international, public, scientific and artistic, social and business communities. The fate of the Korean and Uyghur ethnic groups and their future in Kyrgyzstan, now more than ever depends on themselves.

Literature

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Appendix

1 Conference Abstracts

Yonson Ahn (Goethe University of Frankfurt)

Diasporic Mobility: ‘Home’ Visits of Korean Nurse ‘Guestworkers’ in Germany

This study looks at diasporic mobility through the practice of “home” visits by the Korean nurses of the migrant generation to Korea in order to frame ongoing links to the birth country. As Baldassar (2001) convincingly points out, return visits that continue well after settlement, have not been conceptualized much as part of the migration experience. This study interprets the nature of visiting “home” as “reverse transnationalism”.

The following questions will be investigated in this study: What are the objectives and activities of those homecoming trips/holidays? How do they negotiate their double sense of simultaneous attachment to and distance from the “homeland”? How do they deal with “double inclusion” and “double exclusion”?

Alexander Kim (Far Eastern Federal University, Ussuriysk)

Deportation and repressions of the Soviet Koreans during the 1930s: Reasons and Results.

Stalin’s repressions in the Soviet Union are a topic of discussion not merely in Russia, but also abroad. It is evident that their assessment changes with the political conjuncture, but no one denies that they took place. The ethnic repressions are among the most hotly debated issues in post-Soviet historiography. On the one
hand, their occurrence contradicted the principles of internationalism and the equal rights of peoples, which had been proclaimed by the Soviet leadership already during the Civil War. On the other hand, the echoes of those repressions are still heard today. Both of these features clearly present themselves in the case of the first ethnic repression, that of the Soviet Koreans.

The aim of this essay is to give an overview of the specifics about the reasons and results of the Koreans’ repression in the Soviet Union. I have analyzed a number of aspects of this process on the basis of archival materials, the works of Soviet and Russian researchers, as well as oral surveys. I will also present my own opinion regarding the most intensively debated topics in terms of those persecutions.

**Alexander Kim (Far Eastern Federal University, Ussuriysk)**

The Current Situation on the Language, Newspapers and Publications of Koreans in Primorye Region in Russia

The Koreans lived in a territory in the south of what is now Russia’s Far East before the arrival of Russian explorers in this area. Thus, they constitute a core population of the contemporary Primor’e Region of the Russian Federation. In much of the nineteenth century, however, the Koreans in the southern part of the Russian Far East were comparatively few. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, because of the difficult economic circumstances on the Korean peninsula and the expansion of Japan, many inhabitants from Korea began to move to the Russian Far East.

As is known, Koreans in the south part of the Russian Far East originally used Hamgyŏng dialect of Korean language, but during 20th Century this dialect changed in many aspects and received different influences. Social activity of the Korean population is reflected in the language and newspapers. Therefore, the aims of this presentation are consideration of the history of newspapers of Primorye Koreans, specifics of changes of the Korean language and the modern situation with these subjects.

**AeRan Jeong (University of Paris)**

Korean Musicians in Japan at the Interface of Two Koreas: Case Study of Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan, (North) Korean Performance Group in Japan

Performance troupe Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan titles itself “North Korean overseas company in Japan.” Founded 1955 in Tokyo, Japan the company is composed of 50 artistes working on dance, song and music, referring specifically to the aesthetics of North Korea with which the company has developed a close relationship
since its birth. Kŭmgangsan Kagŭktan was invited to perform in South Korea for the first time in the 2000s, during the engagement policy (1998-2008) agreed to by the two Koreas. This paper explores the artistic practice of two musicians of the company, HA Yŏng-Su, percussionist, and CH’OE Yŏng-Tŏk, changsaenap (Korean wind instrument) player, revealing their adaptations, negotiations, confrontations and range of artistic and political obstacles working in Japan at the interface between North and South Koreas. The individual artist’s voice is presented over the institutional voice. Fieldwork notes, audio-visual materials and interviews are the primary sources for this Ethnoscenological study.

**Jerôme de Wit (Tübingen University)**

The Tear-Drenched Tumen: The Psychological Impact of Border Changes Depicted in Chang Ryul’s *Tumen River* (2011)

On a geographical level, rivers connect: state with state, interior with exterior, one region with another, the past with the present. At the same time rivers are also a separating force: separating nations, subcultures, and families. For the Korean Chinese living at the border with North Korea, the Tumen River contains all these aforementioned meanings within its being. The crossing of this river is seen as the foundation on which the identity of the Korean minority in China rests. Its psychological and cultural significance is revealed by the vast amount of songs, oral narratives, and literature about the Tumen River.

Like the river, the meanings that are ascribed to the Tumen River are always in flux. Until the beginning of the 21st Century, crossing the river from China to North Korea, and vice-versa was not very daunting and was a natural mode of daily life for the Korean Chinese. They would visit family, visit friends, or do business without any impediments from either state. The last fifteen years, however, the river has transformed not only into a natural border, but a psychological, cultural and more recently a physical border as well. The cause of this has been the steady influx of North Korean refugees. Given the significance and importance of the Tumen River to the identity of the Korean Chinese, a shift can be seen in their attitude towards the river. The Korean Chinese director Chang Ryul depicts in his movie *Tumen River* (2011) these different attitudes and changes in a subtle, yet powerful way. In my paper, I will analyse what the river signifies to the characters in the movie, what role it plays in their day-to-day lives, and how they try to cope with the idea that the Tumen River has changed into a physical and impassable border between North Korea and China.
The Koreans in Kazakhstan and Their Yukchin Dialect

After the break-up of the USSR the Korean diaspora’s language, culture and history in the CIS have become one of the most investigated trends in Korean studies. This report considers the language problems of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan and their further perspectives of research concerning this field.

The language of the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan and other regions of the CIS is called Kore-Mar (KM), and it is one of the language types of variation – Koine which appeared due to foreign language environment under migration conditions. It was formed on the basis of interaction (koinezation) of two dialects of the Northern-hamgyen province in Korea spoken by residents of two regions – Yukchin and Menchon. Linguists call the dialects of Yukchin and Menchon in accordance with the names of these regions. On the one hand, they have distinguishing features from each other, and on the other hand, they differ from dialects of the Korean peninsula. Thus, the KM combines features of the contacting dialects Yukchin and Menchon. As it is known Yukchin is one of the most archaic dialects of the Korean language that has kept the most archaic features, that can be traced back to the 15-th century. That is the reason why it is of great interest for the Korean linguistics. Unfortunately, at present, there are no people left alive speaking in this dialect. However, it has not completely disappeared, its separate features have penetrated into a new communication system Kore-Mar which comprises the properties of both dialects as a constituent part.

Apart from the research of the range of problems considered in the report, it contains the research results of glottogonic processes connected not only with the extinction of the dialect but with the formation of a new communication system on the example of the language of Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan.

Sohee Ryuk (Colgate University)

Experiencing Diaspora: Ethnic Perception and the Ethnic Identity of Koreans in Kazakhstan

Understanding the identity of ethnic Koreans in the former Soviet Union, or Koryo Saram, is a complex process that spans a vast geographic area, periods of tumultuous change and continuity, and varied state policies. The collective identity of an ethnic group stems from various factors including a shared language, history, traditions, and collective memory, namely memory shared by members of a certain group of people. In the context of the multi-ethnic state of Kazakhstan, I explore the ways in which perceptions of ethnicity and otherness affect the construction of
a shared identity for ethnic Koreans. Using ethnographic interviews, I analyze how perception and awareness of ethnicity figure into and shape narratives of identity and lived experiences of ethnic Koreans.

Svetlana Kim (University Vienna)

The Situation of the Korean Ethnic Community in Usbekistan

The minority of Koryo-saram in Uzbekistan has undergone many changes since they were forcibly deported from the Russian Far East to Central Asia under Stalin’s rule in 1937. Until the 1950s they were lauded as pioneering cultivators of vast virgin lands, leading to a rapid increase in Uzbek agricultural output (rice in particular), whereas later many of the Koreans held leading roles in academic, financial or official sectors. As another feasible transformation, the minority’s demography is noticeably diminishing: Every year more and more Koreans emigrate to Russia or to the Republic of Korea against the backdrop of rising nationalism (and thus marginalization of minorities) in Central Asia. It is still unclear whether the once highly esteemed “model minority” will be able to (re-)adapt to the contemporary South Korean society. Some of them emigrated to Western Europe where (for example in Germany and Austria) communities of Koryo-saram have emerged. – This presentation gives a historical account of the Koryo-saram, beginning with the first settlements in the Russian Far East in the 19th century, the political background of accusations regarding Japanese espionage, which led to their deportation in 1937. The way their lives gradually developed under harsh conditions in Uzbekistan will be mentioned, and how Stalin’s death led to better conditions until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Afterwards, the Koreans who remained in Central Asia ceased to be perceived as fellow Soviet Koreans, but instead were simply transformed to Korean minorities of each respective country who, for a large part, solely spoke Russian without any knowledge of the host country’s language (like Uzbek or Kazakh). – The historical account shall be used to discuss important cultural, political and socio-economic factors surrounding the Koryo-saram in Uzbekistan: the development of their distinct literature with touching memoirs, their struggling for preservation of the Korean language and culture in the midst of severe Russification policies, their erring search for identity, their social positions, education details and migration rates etc, often by comparing them with data on the little community of Koryo-saram in Germany and Austria. This presentation ends with depicting their situation today, and ventures into mentioning contemporary and future challenges or opportunities for the Korean minority in and from Uzbekistan.
Fabian Jintae Froese (University of Göttingen)

Adjustment and Health of North Korean Refugees in South Korea

During the past years an increasing number of North Koreans have fled the country and entered South Korea via different transition routes. This study analyzed data from surveys and medical examinations of 394 North Korean refugees adjusting to their new lives in South Korea to better understand the relationship among socio-cultural adjustment, psychological adjustment, and physical health. Specifically, we focused on resting heart rate, as an indicator of mortality and a risk factor of cardiovascular and metabolic diseases. Our results showed a positive association between socio-cultural adjustment and psychological adjustment. Furthermore, we detected a so called “inconsistent mediation”, i.e., socio-cultural adjustment had a positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect on resting heart rate via psychological adjustment. These findings imply a double-edged role of socio-cultural adjustment. On the one hand, socio-cultural adjustment to the fast-paced and stressful life in an industrialized country may reduce physical health; while on the other hand, it may improve mental health, which in turn results in better physical health. Additional results also revealed the direct and indirect influence of refugees’ employment status on resting heart rate, implying that refugees who work are better adjusted and have better health. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Michael Fuhr (Hannover University)

K-Pop Diaspora: Transnational Mobilities and Cultural Intermediaries

Migrants play a significant role in contemporary South Korean idol pop music, also known as K-Pop. Especially second and third generation overseas Koreans have been increasingly flowing back to their ‘home country’ since the early 1990s to work in the music industry. Due to localization strategies in recent K-pop music production and growing K-Pop fandom around the globe, more and more foreigners have also been intruding into the domestic star system. By capitalizing their specific status as cultural brokers, immigrant K-Pop aspirants and idols enjoy transnational cultural capital or even stardom and are part and parcel of the industry’s ‘globalization’ activities. But they can also fall prey to Othering inclinations unleashed through the K-Pop specific star production system or by hyperbolic patriotism of the public. In the realm of international K-Pop fandom, they act as cultural intermediaries between local fan communities and the Korean entertainment industry. This presentation will discuss the entanglements of K-pop stardom and fandom, transnational mobility, and identity politics. These will be illustrated
with examples taken from ethnographic field research and interviews conducted in South Korea and Germany.

**Jin-Heon Jung (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity)**

North Korean Migrants in South Korea: Ethnic Identity and Religious Encounters

This paper discusses the shifting identity politics of North Korean immigrants in South Korea; while the state no longer celebrates these migrants from the North as anticommmunist heroes or heroines, it is within the civil spaces, in particular evangelical churches, and in the logic of human rights, that they are empowered to be born again as evangelists, missionaries, human rights activists, self-made entrepreneurs, and thus model “free” citizens who envision the future of a reunified Korea.

As of today, the number of North Korean migrants who came by way of China to the South is about 30 thousand. Until recently startling more than 85 percent of them identify themselves as Christian when arriving in South Korea. And majority of them continue to attend church regularly, not to mention the number of those who became ordained as pastors or missionaries has been increasing. Based on ethnographic research on the complicated interrelations between church networks and North Korean migration, this paper examines the ambivalent processes and meanings of Christian conversion among the migrants in the context of late-Cold War East Asia.

**Nazarova Ogulgerek (Korea University)**

There have been different studies about the origin of Koryoin and the reason of their resettlement in different spheres. Through different studies by experienced professors and researchers we have heard about Koreans of the Far East, Sakhalin, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but how about Koreans of Turkmenistan? They have been left behind neither investigated nor studied. Still a lot of researchers and scholars don’t know that many Koreans had lived there since 1950s. Through this paper I will try to give a brief summary of Ethnic Koreans in Turkmenistan: their life from early 30s to nowadays, immigration, language, culture, difference of customs and religions. I personally talked to Koreans from Turkmenistan to show more widely a different outlook on life and environment perception of young generation and middle-aged Koreans through this paper. Also, I give an example of the reduction of the number of ethnic Koreans in Turkmenistan. Furthermore, this paper will suggest some solutions including a constant bilateral cooperation between Turkmenistan and Korea.
**Sung Sook Lim (University of British Columbia)**

Older Mothers on the Move: Transnational Return Mobility and Family dis/connection among older Sakhalin Koreans

Since 2000, the Japanese and South Korean governments have arranged return migration for older Koreans on Sakhalin Island (the Russian Far East) to South Korea. This project has been facilitated in the name of humanitarianism, but the entitlement of return is limited to older people. Consequently, this return policy has brought about parent-child separation in a transnational space. Focusing on moral discourses around mother-child separation and reunion between Russia and South Korea, I explore how older Sakhalin Korean women imagine, criticize, and make sense of older mothers’ migration to South Korea. This ethnographic study with a focus on new gendered and kinship imaginaries among older Sakhalin Korean women shows how return mobility of diasporas is shaped by gender, age, and life course. My study also offers a broader understanding of personhood and transnational lives of Korean diasporas in post-Cold War transformations.

2 **Conference Participants**

His Excellency See-jeong Chang, The Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Hamburg

Prof. Dr. Ulrike Beisiegel, President of the Georg August University Goettingen

Dr. Wolfram Horstmann, Director of the Goettingen State and University Library

Prof. Dr. Alexander Kim, Far Eastern Federal University, Ussuriysk, Russia

Prof. Dr. German Kim, Director of the International Centre for Korean Studies, Kazakh National University, Almaty

Prof. Dr. Nelly Pak, Director, Center for Korean Studies, Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Ogulgerek Nazarova, Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan

Prof. Dr. Alexander Kim, Far Eastern Federal University, Ussuriysk, Russia

Prof. Dr. Yonson Ahn, Goethe University, Frankfurt

Dr. AeRan Jeong, University Paris
Appendix

Dr. Michael Fuhr, Hannover University - Hochschule für Musik, Theater und Medien

Dolf Neuhaus, Goethe University, Frankfurt

PD Dr. Johannes Reckel, Georg August University Goettingen

Dr. Jin-Heon Jung, Goettingen, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Prof. Dr. Dr. Fabian J. Froese, Georg August University Goettingen

Prof. Dr. Jérôme de Wit, Eberhard-Karls-University Tuebingen
Mi Jeong Jo, Goethe University, Frankfurt

Svetlana Kim, University Vienna/Usbekistan

Sohee Ryuk, Thomas J. Watson Fellow at Colgate University, US
### Conference Program

**Wednesday, February 17**

*At the Convention Centre at the Old Observatory, Geismar Landstr. 11, 37083 Goettingen*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Presenter(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Welcome from the Director of the State- and University Library and Opening The Korean Collection and its tradition in Goettingen</td>
<td>Dr. Wolfram Horstmann</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:20</td>
<td>Korean Diaspora: From history to present day</td>
<td>His Excellency See-jeong Chang</td>
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<td>10:40</td>
<td>Chosŏnjok – The Koreans of Manchuria in China – A story of two thousand years?</td>
<td>PD Dr. Johannes Reckel</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Deportation and repressions of the Soviet Koreans during the 1930s: Reasons and results</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Alexander Kim</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Korean Language Education of Koryo Saram before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. German Kim</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 – 13:30</td>
<td>Lunch given by the Director of the State and University Library of Goettingen for active participants at the “Restaurant Planea”, 1st floor, Faculty Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>Welcome from the President of the University of Goettingen</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Ulrike Beisiegel</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>The Koreans in Kazakhstan and their Yukchín dialect</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Nelly Pak</td>
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<td>14:30</td>
<td>Koreans in Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Ogulgerek Nazarova</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>The current situation on the language, newspapers and publications of Koreans in Primorye region in Russia</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Alexander Kim</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:00</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Diasporic mobilities: ‘Home’ visit of Korean nurse ‘guestworkers’ in Germany”</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Yonson Ahn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>16:30</td>
<td>Korean Musicians in Japan at the Interface of Two Koreas: Case Study of Kūmgangsan Kagūktan, (North) Korean Performance Group in Japan</td>
<td>Dr. AeRan Jeong</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>K-Pop Diaspora: Transnational Mobilities and Cultural Intermediaries</td>
<td>Dr. Michael Fuhr</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:30</td>
<td>Korean Students in Japan and their Interactions with Japanese Protestantism</td>
<td>Dolf Neuhaus</td>
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<td>18:30</td>
<td>Dinner given by the Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Hamburg, His Excellency Chang See-jeong, for active participants, “Restaurant Planea”</td>
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Thursday, February 18th

*At the Convention Centre at the Old Observatory, Geismar Landstr. 11, 37083 Goettingen*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>09:30</td>
<td>North Korean Refugees in South Korea – Ethnic identity and religious encounters</td>
<td>Dr. Jin-Heon Jung</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Adjustment and health of North Korean refugees in South Korea</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Dr. Fabian J. Froese</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>The Tear-Drenched Tumen: The Psychological Impact of Border Changes Depicted in Chang Ryul's Tumen River (2011)</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Jerôme de Wit</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Marriage Migration and Multi-Cultural Family: From Uzbekistan to Republic of Korea, 1991–2015</td>
<td>Mi Jeong Jo</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30—12:00</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00</td>
<td>The situation of the Korean ethnic community in Usbekistan</td>
<td>Svetlana Kim</td>
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<td>12:30</td>
<td>Unveiling the Layers of Identity: Ethnic Koreans in the Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>Sohee Ryuk</td>
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<td>13:00—14:30</td>
<td>Lunch Break (individual arrangements) at the restaurant “La Locanda, Reinhäuser Landstr. 22”</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>14:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Workshop on the literature and language preservation of Korean Communities outside Korea - The role of libraries and archives for the preservation of an ethnic heritage</td>
<td>All</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Visit to the Historical collection of Asian books and manuscripts in the State- and University Library Goettingen (walk from the Conference Hall to the old building of the library in the centre of town)</td>
<td>All</td>
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<tr>
<td>19:00</td>
<td>Dinner (individual arrangements)</td>
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In this book, scholars from disciplines like anthropology, history, linguistics and philology engage with the subject of how Koreans who live outside Korea had to (re-)define their own distinct cultural life in a foreign environment. Most Koreans in the diaspora define themselves through their ancestry, their language and their religion. Language serves as a strong argument for defining one’s own identity within a multi-ethnic society. Ethnic Koreans in the diaspora tend to cultivate their own very special dialects. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of China, most ethnic Koreans in Central Asia, Manchuria and Siberia came again into close contact with Koreans especially from South Korea. There is a certain desire amongst many ethnic Koreans to learn the standard Korean language instead of sticking to their own dialects. This volume investigates constructions of Korean diasporic identity from a variety of temporal and spatial contexts.