This dissertation examines Article 15 of the German Constitution, which permits land, natural resources, and means of production to be transferred to common or other forms of public ownership by law. Although socialisation has not been implemented since the Constitution came into force, the topic is gaining renewed relevance in times of social and economic crisis. A recent example is the Berlin initiative ‚Deutsche Wohnen & Co enteignen‘, which seeks to transfer housing stock in Berlin into common ownership. Article 15 cannot be easily categorised within the conventional constitutional norm categories of fundamental rights, state objectives, or institutional guarantees. Nevertheless, it is more than a mere enabling provision. Rather, Article 15 should be regarded as a sui generis collective constitutional right. This classification has significant implications for the implementation of a socialisation law, particularly with respect to the principle of proportionality and the requirement for socialisation compensation. Furthermore, the dogmatic classification and the concept of a common economy imply that collective forms of ownership necessitate collective decision-making structures. Such structures are essential in socialisation law to ensure public participation in ownership. Accordingly, this thesis explores the extent to which the democratic principle necessitates democratic legitimisation of those empowered to make decisions within the legal entity of collective ownership. The structure of the socialisation provision makes it evident that the legal entities managing socialised property fall within the scope of functional self-administration. Finally, the concept of a public-law institution, as proposed by the initiative ‚Deutsche Wohnen & Co enteignen‘, is analysed as a practical example.